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Using data from the United Nations Comparison Project and the Penn
World Table, we find that machinery and equipment investment has a strong
association with growth: over l9&)—l95 each percent of GDP invested in
equipment is associated with an increase in GDP growth of 1/3 a percentage
point per year. This is a much stronger association than found between growth
and any of the other components of investment. A variety of considerations
suggest that this association is causal, that higher equipment investment drives
faster growth,andthat the social return to equipment investment in well-
functioning market economies is on the order of 30 percent per year.
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I.Introduction
Itis no accident that the era in which European economic growth took
off is called the Industrial Revolution. Blanqui [18371, first to use the
phrase in print, identified its beginnings in the invention and spread of those
"two machines, henceforth immortal, the steam engine and the cotton-
spinning [water frame]." Ever since, qualitative historical discussions of
growth have emphasized the role of machinery investment in augmenting
labor power. Landes' [1969] statement that "the machine is at the heart of
the new economic civilization" is typical of accounts that have assigned a
central role to mechanization. Technology embodied in machinery has been,
as Mokyr [1990] says, "the lever of riches."
Yet at least until recently modern quantitative studies of economic
growth have tended to downplay the role of mechanization. Work in the
aggregated growth accounting tradition of Solow [1957], Denison [1967],
and Abramovitz [1956] has typically concluded that capital accumulation
accounts for only a relatively small fraction of productivity growth in
individual countries, or of differences across countries.1 The assumption
underlying growth accounting calculations that capital is paid its marginal
product, coupled with observed profit rates, implies that increasingthe rate
of capital accumulation can make only a modest contribution to increasing
growth in net product. Even a doubling of the U.S. net private investment
rate would, according to standard estimates, raise the growth rate of real
income by less than half a percentage point per year.
This paper provides quantitative evidence in support of the older,
traditional view that the accumulation of machinery is a prime determinant
'More disaggregated growth accounting studies like those of Jorgenson [1988]. which consider
different types of capital and draw a distinction between capital stocks and capital services, have
typically found a larger role for accumulation in accounting for growth in some countries. Wediscuss
the relationship between our findings and those of more disaggregated growth accounting studies in
the conclusion.Investment and Grmt/i 3 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
of national rates of productivity growth, and against the supposition that the
private return to equipment investment mirrors its social product. Using
data on the components of investment drawn from the United Nations
International Comparison Project (U.N. ICP) (see Kravis, Heston, and
Summers [1982] and United Nations [1985]) and Summers and Heston
[1988, 1990], we demonstrate a clear, strong and robust statistical
relationship between national rates of machinery and equipment investment
and productivity growth. Equipment investment has far more explanatory
power for national rates of productivity growth than other components of
investment, and outperforms many other variables included in cross-country
equations accounting for growth High rates of equipment investment can,
for example, account for nearly all of Japan's extraordinary growth
performance.
Timing evidence, consideration of alternative sources of variation in
equipment investment, the behavior of equipment prices, and the differing
association of equipment investment with intensive and extensive growth all
suggest that this association is causal, with higher equipment investment
driving faster economic growth. We interpret our results as suggesting that
the social return to equipment investment in well-functioning market
economies is on the order of thirty percent per year.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II motivates our emphasis
on equipment investment and presents information on equipment prices and
quantities for our sample of countries. Section III presents the basic results
linking equipment investment and productivity growth. It also explores
their robustness along a number of dimensions including variations in
sample period, the sample of countries, the inclusion of additional
determinants of growth, various interactions, and alternative measures of
equipment investment.
Section IV addresses the issue of causality in the relationship between
equipment investment and growth. The pattern of equipment prices supports
the claim that fast-growing countries are those with favorable supplyInvestnent and Growth 4 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
conditions for producers' equipment, not those where some third factor has
accelerated growth and shifted the demand curve for producers' equipment
outward. Section IV also examines the timing of the relationship between
equipment investment and growth, the effects of alternative sources of
variation in equipment investment on productivity growth, and the
differential association of equipment investment with that part of GDP
growth generated by rising productivity and that part generated by an
increasing labor force. Section V concludes by discussing the relationship
between our results and previous arguments suggesting the unimportance of
capital formation, and considering the normative implications of our
findings.
II.Equipment Investment and Economic Structure
A.Equipment Investment and Economic Development
There are at least three grounds for suspecting that equipment
investment may have higher social returns than other forms of investment.2
First, as we have already noted, historical accounts of economic growth
invariably assign a central role to mechanization. Economic historians have
seen the richest countries as those that were first in inventing and applying
capital intensive technologies, in which machines embody the most
advanced technological knowledge (see, for example, Usher [1920], Landes
[1969], and Pollard [1982]). The history of economic growth is often
written as if nations and industries either seized the opportunity to intensify
their specialization in manufactures and grew rapidly, or failed to seize such
opportunities and stagnated (as in Rostow [1958] or Gerschenkron [1962]).
2Jorgenson's [1988]work highlightsthat equipment investment will have a larger short-run effect on
growth ingross productthan othertorms of invesmientbecauseof equipment's higher depreciation
rate even if private and social returns to different forms of investment are equalized. In the long run,
however. equipment's higher depreciation rate leads it to havea smallereffect on growth. We discuss
these issues in the conclusion.Investnent and Grou'tli Fri, Oct 5, 1990
Second, discussions of economic growth in the development
economics (like Hirschman [1958] or Chenery eta!. [1986]) and the new
growth theory traditions (like Romer [1986]) stress external economies or
"linkages" as causes of growth. Spillovers may well be larger in some
sectors than others. Manufacturing accounts for ninety-five percent of
private-sector research and development in America, and within
manufacturing the equipment sector accounts for more than half of research
and development according to Summers [1990]. Hence, it is plausible that
equipment investment will give rise to especially important external
economies.
Third, it is often alleged that a number of countries have succeeded in
growing rapidly by pursuing a government-led "developmental state"
approach to development. The rationale for this policy is that countries
which adopt the price and quantity structure of more affluent nations are
more likely to grow than those that possess the structure of poorer countries.
The government should jump-start the industrialization process by
transforming economic structure faster than private entrepreneurs would.3
As we discuss below, rates of equipment investment tend to increase and
their price tends to fall as productivity rises. If the developmental state
approach is correct, countries investing more heavily in and enjoying lower
equipment prices should enjoy more rapid growth.
B. Measuring Equipment Investment
Data on the share of nominal national product devoted to equipment
have long been available from national income accounts data. However,
these data do not permit an accurate assessment of the impact of equipment
investment on growth unless the relative price of equipment is constant
across countries. The availability of data from the U.N. ICP, described in
Kravis, Heston and Summers [1982], provides information on the relative
prices of many components of GNP at a disaggregated level for a large
3Workstaking this point of view include Cohen ind Zysman 19871 and Johnson 119821.Investment andGrowth 6 Fri,Oct5, 1990
sample of countries for individual snapshot" years. It is therefore possible
to study in a cross section of nations the relationship between investment
components and growth.
The ICP collects data on three components of producers' durable
investment—producers' transportation equipment, electrical machinery, and
non-electrical machinery. In an earlier draft of this paper (De Long and
Summers [1990]) we investigated the relationship between total producers'
durable investment—the sum of these three components—and productivity
growth. In carrying out the research reported here, we realized there was
little information in the producers' transportation component of durables,
and so in this paper we focus primarily on an equipment aggregate
comprising electrical and non-electrical machinery. With the benefit of
hindsight the exclusion of producers' transportation equipment can perhaps
be justified by arguing that much variation in rates of transportation
investment reflects differences in the "need" for transportation caused by
differences in urbanization and population density.
FigureI
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C. Economic Structures and GDP per WorkerLevels
The most extensive ICP data on equipment investment comes from the
Phase IV 1980 survey which covers more than sixty countries.4 Figures I
and 11 plot, respectively, our estimates of the real price of equipment
relative to the GDP deflator in 1980 and of the average 1960—85 share of
GDP devoted to equipment investment against 1980 GDP per worker for
those nations in our sample in ICP Phase IV. We draw three principal
conclusions.
FigureII
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First,variations in relative prices of equipment are large, and so
measures of the share of nominal national product devoted to equipment
investment are likely to be misleading guides to real magnitudes. As
4Kravis, Heston. and Summers11982!reportICPPhase Ill estimates of relative price and quantity
structures in 1975 for sixty percent of the Phase IV countries. We merge the 1975 Phase 1H and 1980
Phase IV snapshots of price and quantity structures with the l960—85 long-run growth data of Penn
World Table V (see Summers and Heston 119901): we have adjusted the ICP estimates using
revisions of published ICP data kindly provided by Robert Summers.
We also omit high-income oil exporting countries from our regressions. Our total sample
consists of sixty-one countries. Appendix IV presents the data series used in our regressions.Invest,nent and Growl/i 8 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
productivity levels increase, there is a tendency for the relative price of
equipment to fall. An increase of 10 percentage points in a country's
income relative to the United States is associated with an 8 percent fall in its
machinery price relative to the GDP deflator.5 This would generate a
positive relationship between the real equipment share and productivity
even if there were no correlation between productivity and the nominal
share of equipment. Beyond the relationship between equipment prices and
productivity, there are sizeable differences in the cost and quantity of
equipment investment between countries at similar levels of development.
Second, as Figure II shows, there are wide variations in national rates
of equipment investment as a share of GDP. Wealthier nations tend to have
higher equipment investment shares: those nations with 1980 GDP per
worker levels less than ten percent of the U.S. have equipment shares,
calculated in the "international dollar" measure of Summers and Heston,
that average 3.5 percent of GDP; those nations with 1980 GDP per worker
levels greater than seventy percent of the U.S. have equipment shares
averaging 8.2 percent of GDP. The cross section variation at given
productivity levels is also substantial. Equipment investment shares in
countries such as Chile and Venezuela are some five percentage points
lower than would be expected given GDP per worker. Equipment
investment shares in countries such as Israel, Japan, and Finland are five
percentage points higher than expected.
Third, poorer nations possess very large relative variances in their
equipment prices and quantities. Those nations with GDP per worker levels
above eighty percent of the U.S. level have a standard deviation of
producers' durables prices about the simple regression line of ten percent;
those nations with GDP per worker levels below twenty percent of the U.S.
level have a standard deviation of more than fifty percent. Some, perhaps
5A similar relationship holds over Lime: the fastest growing countries are also those that have
experienced the steepest declines in relative real machinery prices. See De Long and Summers
[1990].Investment and Growth 9 Fri. Oct 5,1990
much, of this variation in prices and quantities at the low end of the
productivity scale is measurement error. Much of the remainder may reflect
differences in the character of investment in very poor countries. For
example, Zambian investment is concentrated in copper mining and copper-
based manufacturing, which employ five percent of its labor force and
where average labor productivity is forty times average labor productivity in
agriculture; relatively small equipment investments in the copper sector will
loom large in the economy as a whole, yet it is difficult to believe that this
sector has significant linkages with the rest of the economy (see Young
[1973] and Bates [1976, 1981]).
We are thus skeptical of what can be learned by combining in one
regression very poor countries, which appear to have productivity levels less
than those enjoyed in the United States before the industrial revolution,6
with technologically-sophisticated developed countries. We therefore
focus heavily on a sample of countries with relatively high productivity
levels: those countries with GDP per worker levels greater than 25 percent
of the U.S. level in 1960.
Before analyzing the relationship between equipment investment and
economic growth in the next section, we pause to highlight the fact that
international patterns of equipment differ from patterns of non-equipment
investment. In our sample, equipment investment averages 28 percent of
total investment, but the composition of investment varies widely. Figure III
plots the 1980 price of equipment investment against the investment
deflator. Figure IV plots our estimate of equipment investment over 1960—
1985 against other investment as a share of GDP. The correlations are
weak—0.203 for the prices, 0.427 for the quantity shares in our sample. In
the case of prices, this should not be too surprising, for equipment is
tradeable while structures—the other major component of investment—are
6According to Summers and Heston. the U.S. today has a realGDPperworker level 14times that of
Zambia. AccordingtoKuznets 11971]. U.S.re,il GDP per worker increasedbya factor of 8 between
1870 and the present. andperhapsslightly less than doubled over the previous century.Investment and Growth 10 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
not.7
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Thefact that equipment's share in total investment varies so widely,
7Warner [1990] notes that 31 percent of U.S. equipment purchases in 1989 were imported.Investment and Growth II Fri, Oct 5, 1990
and the centrality of machinery in historical discussions of growth suggest
the importance of disaggregating investment in considering its relation to
economic growth. If machinery and structures contribute differently to
growth, then analyses of the relationship between total capital accumulation
and growth are likely to be very misleading. Likewise, the use of an
investment price deviation from a "normal" level as a proxy for the extent
of distortions in an economy, as in Barro [1990], appears implausible given
that structures are not traded and that the investment deflator depends
heavily on the price of structures and on the composition of investment.
HI.Equipment and Growth
Thissection demonstrates that nations which invested heavily in
equipment relative to other nations at the same stage of economic
development enjoyed rapid growth over 1960—1985. Our measure of
economic growth is the growth rate of GDP per worker, measured in
international dollars, as reported by Summers and Heston [1990]. In
evaluating the contribution of equipment investment to growth, we hold
constant labor force growth rates, the share of GDP devoted to non-
equipment investment, and the level of GDP per worker. For the most part,
we rely on the inclusion of the initial GDP per worker gap in the regressions
to control for any systematic causal relationship running from the level of
GDP per worker to the level of equipment investment. We also experiment
with using a gap variable from the middle of the sample, as recommended
by Romer [1989].
A. Basic Results
Figure V, and equation 1 beneath it, report our basic results obtained
using the high productivity sample of the 25 nations with 1960 levels of
GDP per worker greater than 25 percent of the U.S. level. Figure VI reportsInvestment and Growth 12 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
thescatter for the same regression using the larger 61-nation sample. The
figures plots that component of 1960—1985 GDP perworker growth
orthogonal to 1960—1985 labor force growth, to the average1960—1985 real
non-equipment investment share of GDP, and to the 1960relative GDP per
worker gap vis-a-vis the United States against that component of the 1960—
85 real equipment investment share of GDP orthogonal to the same three
variables. That is, it provides a partial scatter of equipment investment and
productivity growth.
FigureV
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Whilethe standard deviation of growth rates in our sampleis 1 .32
percent, the standard error of the equation using equipmentquantities
illustrated in figure V is only 0.80 percent. Including the equipmentvariable
reduces the variance of the residual by 47 percent compared to asimilar
equation containing the aggregate investment share.The equation provides
strong support for the proposition that equipmentinvestment is more closelyInvestment and Growth 13 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
related to growth than are other components of investment.
FigureVI
Partial Scatter of Growth and Equipment Investment, 1960—85
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The regressionline of equation I implies that an increase of 3
percentage points (one standard deviation) in the share of GDP devoted to
equipment investment leads to an increase in the growth of GDP per worker
of 1.02 percent per year, which cumulates to a 29 percent difference over
the 25 years of the sample. This means, for example, that differences in
equipment investment account for essentially all of the extraordinary growth
performance of Japan relative to the sample as a whole. Conditional on the
initial GDP per worker gap and the achieved rates of growth of the labor
force, Japan has achieved a relative GDP per worker growth rate edge of 2.2
percent per year over 1960—1985 relative to the average of the high
productivity sample, and five percent per year relative to Argentina. In both
cases, more than four-fifths of this difference is accounted for by Japan'sInvestment aridGrowth 14 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
high quantity of equipment investment.8
The shift to a larger sample in Figure VI does not materially affect the
coefficient of the equipment quantity variable. We performed Chow tests to
see if the same structure holds for countries with 1960 GDP per worker
levels greater than and less than 25 percent of the U.S. and failed to reject
the null hypothesis of a common structure of regression coefficients.9
B. Statistical Issues
The regression lines depicted in Figures V and VI and equations 1 and
1' were obtained using OLS. We verified that the standard errors were not
appreciably affected by allowing for conditional heteroscedasticity. A more
significant issue is spatial correlation.1° If neighboring nations have similar
values for significant omitted variables, the data will contain less
information than the reported standard errors suggest. In a sense, country
pairs like Norway and Sweden or Argentina and Uruguay seem a priori not
two observations but more nearly one single observation—we would not
feel that we had lost information if we had data not on Belgium and the
Netherlands separately but on the Benelux aggregate instead.
However, when we examined the pattern of the residuals from the
high productivity sample we found to our surprise no sign of spatial
8Japanese growth performance was extraordinary even before the post-World War H period. High
equipment quantities and low prices characterized its economy far back into history. The argument
that abnormally low equipment prices have had a strong impact on growth in Japan by significantly
increasing the returns to saving is made by Dc Bever and Williamson 11978]. who note abnormally
low producers' durable prices in Japan and suggest... that this unique relative price behavior has its
source in the technological dynamics of Japan's capital goods industry... (and] deserves far more
attention than Japanese analysts have given it so far. An argument that Japan has achieved high
growth by concentrating investment in equipment rather than structures is made in Pattick and
Rosovsky 119761.
9We always reject the null hypothesis that the residual variances are the same across the 25percent
of 1960 U.S. GDP per worker divide. Non-parametric tests do reject the hypothesis of a common
structure of regression coefficients.
'°See Case 119871.Investment and Growth 15 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
correlation. Weregressedthe productuiuj of the regression residualsfor all
country pairs onthe distancebetween thecapitalsofcountryi and countryj.
We expected to findthatthe product of the residuals would tend to be high
when countries had capitalsthatwere close together. We did not: fora
varietyof specifications the estimated dependence of uiuj on distance was
statistically insignificant and substantively unimportant. We report some of
ourresults on spatial correlationinanappendix.
We alsoexamined sensitivity tooutliersby droppingeachofthe
observations inturn. Thereareno individual observationsthat, when
omitted,changetheequipment investment coefficient by as much as ten
percentinthesample ofthe 25high-income nations.11
The mostsignificant statistical issue is thatthe equations reported here
arenot thefirstequationswehave estimated.Ourearlierworkexplored
variousprice variables in more detail, and also examined an equipment
aggregate that included transportation equipment, unlike the aggregate used
here. We thus choose the current set of specifications partially on empirical
rather than a priori grounds.
Since finishing the bulk of the empirical work for this paper, we have
obtained data on equipment quantities for five additional countries.12
Adding these five points to our basic regression raises the coefficient on
equipment investment by an insignificant amount. When data from later
versions of the ICP become available for a larger number of new countries,
it will be possible to further check the validity of the estimates we present
using a sample not available when the estimates were generated.
11Hong Kong is the most influential observation, having a veryhighgrowth rate given its equipment
investment share. In the larger sample of 61 countries, Botswana and Zambia are influential outliers,
as we discuss below.
12Australia. Iran. New Zealand, Turkey. and Sweden.Investment and Growth 16 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
C. Sample Selection Issues
There are two important dimensions of sample selection involved in
figure V and equation 1—the choice of countries included in the analysis,
and the choice of a sample period. These issues are addressed in Table I. It
considers the 1970—1985, the 1975—1985, and the 1960—1975 periods as
well as the 1960—1985 period as a whole. The results for the equipment
investment variable are not sensitive to the choice of a sample period.
Table I also compares the results obtained using the high productivity
sample of countries with 1960 GDP per worker greater than 25 percent of
the U.S. level with results obtained using the larger 61 country sample, and
with results obtained using the 61 country sample while controlling for
various educational and political correlates of growth as in Barro [1990a.13
If differences in the reduced-form laws of motion followed by rich and poor
countries spring from poor countries' lack of the human and political
infrastructures necessary to take advantage of modern technologies and to
make fixed capital-intensive investments in technologies secure, including
variables such as literacy and education rates should improve the power of
regressions on the larger sample.14 The additional variables do contribute
modestly to the explanatory power of the regressions, but do not have an
appreciable impact on the equipment coefficients. For the entire1960—1985
period, our results suggest that a twenty five percentage point increasein
both primary and secondary education rates has the same partial association
with growth as a one percentage point rise in the equipment investment
share of national product. Table I also explores the effect of replacing the
initial 1960 GDP per worker gap relative to the U.S. with the 1975, mid-
sample period gap.15 This replacement has no material effect on the
equipment investment coefficient.
13Thecoefficients on the correlates favored by Barro I 1990al are reportedin Appendix II.
14The additional political and human capital correlates would have little effect in the high
productivity sample because they do not vary much among developed countries.
15As suggested by Romer 119891.Investment andGrrnt'th 17 Fri. Oct 5. 1990
Tab'eI
Productivity Growth and Equipment Investment
PeriodLab. fee.GDP/wkr.Equipment3 Struc. & R2
used erowth sharcnans,share n (RMSE)
!Iih Productivity Sample
1960-1985-0.002 0.030 0.337 -1)015 23 0662
10.146) (0.009) (0.0541 (0.033) 0.008)
1960-1985 0.023 0.0I6' 0.36) -0.019 25 0.507
(1975 Gap) (0.1791 0.0(1> (0.071)1 (1)040) O.009)
1960-1975-0.08) 0.049 0.295 .0.056 25 0.492
(0.1971 (0.013) 40.0751 >1)043> 10.011)
1970-1985-0.030 0.015 0.379 -0.025 25 0.593
(0.163) (0.011) (((.063) >0.034> (0.009)
1975-1985-0.177 0.44)4 0.425 0.047 25 0.428
10.258) (0.14)0> (0.405) ((1)459) >0.0)3)
Larger Sample
1960-1985-0.03) 0.02)) 0.265 0.182 (,l 0.29)
40.198) 0(4)9) (((.1>65> (0.1)35> (0.0)3)
1960-1985 0,1(5) 0i14' 0214> (4,1)5>> 0) 1)274
11975 1ap(0.2)39) 0(8)3) ((.1>70> (0.1(10> (1)44(4)
1960-1975-0.088 0.0(3 0.181 ((.035 61 0.093
(0.243) (0.0)2> 40.083) 0.043> (0.017)
1970-1985-0.076 0.023 0.256 0.068 6) 0.208
(0.236) (0.010) (0.075> 40.042) (0.016)
1975-1985-0.372 0.026 0.29) 0.112 6) 0.192
(0.305) (0.012) (0.101) (0.053) >0.020)
Larger Sample ti'ith Barro Correlaies
1960-1985-0.001 0.039 0275 0.029 6) 0391
(0.203) (0.0134 (0.070) (0.037) 40.012)
1960-1985 0.0)1 o,023b 0.307 0.030 61 0299
(1975 Gap)(0.206) (0.011) (0074) (0.040) (0.0)3)
1960-1975 0.019 0.039 0.279 -0.01) 6) 0.263
(0.233) (0.0)6) (0.086) 0.1)13> (0.0)5)
1970-1985 -0.217 0.038 0.276 0.040 6) 0.236
40.270> 0.0)7> (0.082) 1(1.047) >0.0)6)
1975-1985-0.537 0.037 0.262 0,097 61 0.190
(0.356) 0.020> >0.) 12> >0.067> >0.020>
equipmentshare,and the tructurc. an>) prixlucers' iran xriation equipment share
variables were constructed av lollows. usine all inlonnation available Summersandlieston
((990) report real mvestlnent as a share of GI)l' (or each year from 19(4) to 191(5 l'he ICP
reports the quanoty ratio ol equIpment to otal invcstincnt in each ol its years- . 970. 1975,
and 1980—for the nations coveted. If (970. 975. and 1984) quantity ratios were all available.
the average equipment share was made by first multiplying the 1970 equipment share of
investment by the average inveStment share of CDI' from 1960-1972. multiplying (he 1975
equipment share of insestincnt by the average investment shurc of GoP From 1973-1977. and
the (980 equipment share of Investment by the average investment shares from 1978-1985.
Then these three values were avcraeecl. If only 1975 and 198)) equipment share of investment
ratios were available, they were muliiplted by average investment share of GDP over 1960-
1977 and 1978- 1985. respectively, and averaged. If only the 1980 equipment share of
investment was available, it was simply multiplied by the average invetlmncnl share of GDP
over l9(mO-1985.
>'Rcgression using the (975 CDI' per worker gapInvestment and Groitth 18 Fri. Oct 5, 1990
Results using the entire 61 nation sample are somewhat sensitive to
outliers. The exclusion of Zambia, for example, raises the adjusted R2 in the
regression underlying figure VI from 0.29 to 0.44; theexclusion of
Botswana would reduce the adjusted R2 from 0.29 to 0.21. Inclusion or
exclusion of these two countriescanmovethe equipmentshare coefficient
between0.21and 0.31, although thecoefficientremainssignificantat
conventionallevels.
Although the larger 61 nation sample is significantly affected by
outliers, it is worth pointing out thatit omitstwooutlier nationswith large
identifying variances that would significantly strengthen ourfindings.
Singapore andTaiwan haveboth hadhigh equipment quantities,low
equipment prices,and rapidproductivity growthin the post-World War II
period.NeitherSingaporenorTaiwan is in our sample. Singapore
surrenderedandregained its independence during our sampleperiod. The
existenceofTaiwan isnot recognizedbyinternational organizations. The
inclusionofthese two observationswould strengthenour conclusions.16
D. Additional Growth Determinants
Itis natural to wonder whether the quantity of equipment is proxying
for some other well-known determinant of growth omitted from our list of
independent variables. Table II reports the results of adding variables
measuring (i) the share of manufacturing in value added, (ii) the importance
of public investment, (iii) the real exchange rate in 1980,17 and (iv) the
continent to our basic specifications. The only case in which the inclusion of
an additional variable has a material impact on the coefficient of equipment
161t is also worth pointing out that omitting the equipment investment share variable from the
regression does not materially raise the coefficient on the other investment share. With equipment
investment omitted, the other investment share has a coefficient of 0.029 for the high productivity
sample and 0.105 for the larger sample: with other investment omitted, the equipment share has a
coefficient m the two samples of 0.332 and 0.300. respectively.
17Since the real exchange rate is significantly related to current GDP per capita. our independent
variable is the residual from a regression of the log 1980 real exchange rate on GDP per capita./m'estnent and Growth 19 Fri, Oct 5,1990
investment is the case in which continent dummies are added to the
regressionusing the high productivity sample.
TableII
Productivity Growth and Equipment Investment with
Additional Correlates of Growth
Additional Equip. shareEquip. share Coeflicient on R2
variable (wig add.vai-.) (with add. var,) acid. var. n(RMSE)
High Produciii'jjr Sample
Publicinvestment' 0337 0.333 0.144 23 0.659
(0.056) (0.058) ((8.296) 10.008)
Mfg.share in GDP8' o.2 (1.277 0.fl. 23Of3
0.058) ) 0115f, ) (((.8827) 10.1107)
Exchangerate 0337 0.333 O.8CI 25 o5AA
((8.054) i0.(i(4,J (P Ii))) 0(108)
Continentdummies
SouthAmerica 0.337 0.053 -((.018) 25 0.856






Publicinvestment0.240 0.236 0.178 52 0.254
(0.075) (0.075) (0.154) (0.012)
MIg.sharein GDP 0.288 0287 0.012 45 0.413
(0.062) (0.063) (0.025) (0.0(8)
Exchangerate 0.265 0.300 .0(107 68 0.294
(0.065) (01)72) (0(85,) (0.0)3)
Continentdummies








'From Barro 11990)1 The rationrealpuh)ic ilonica,c Invevimenl to rca) don,eauc ,nvestmen)—
averac over (970—83.
eThe rulio of rca) maflufacturilig value added In real GDP In 8980.
CThere arc no Africaniia)Rnsin (he high produclivily sample.Investneni andGrowth 20 Fri,Oct 5, 1990
The lack of effect of continent dummies in the larger sample is
perhaps worth a further note. Much of the identifying variance in our
regressions does come from a comparison of East Asia to South America,
butthereis substantial variation within continents as well. Considering
islands and peninsulas along the coast of Asia, Hong Kong, Japan, and
Korea have low equipment prices, high equipment quantities, and rapid
growth while Sri Lanka and the Philippines have high equipment prices,
low quantities, and slow growth. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay arepoorly-
performing South American nations, but Brazil has performed well. In
Africa, Senegal, Madagascar, and Zambia have performed badly, but the
Ivory Coast, Botswana, and Tunisia have all grown relatively rapidly.
The high productivity sample lacks these within-continent contrasts.
The high productivity sample contains the United States, Canada, fast-
growing Asians, slow-growing Latin Americans, and many intermediate
European nations. Within Latin America the association between growth
and equipment investment is strong. Within Europe it is not. And there are
many more European than Latin American data points in the sample.
A great deal of attention has been devoted in recent years to the
relationship between pricing distortions—particularly protection—and
growth. The 1987 World Development Report has provided perhaps the
most powerful statement of the case that relative economic success or
failure is to a significant degree a function of the government's willingness
to see its industry compete with foreign producers for the domestic market
on a level playing field. Unfortunately, quantitative measures of the
importance of protectionist barriers are not available, and the qualitative
measures available do not match the sample of countries that we have used.
Table LII examines the relationship between growth and equipment
investment holding constant measures of the incidence of distortions.
Measures of distortions are drawn from Luca Barbone's (1988) assessment
of OECD openness using residuals from a modified gravity trade model;Investment andGrowth 2I Fri.Oct 5, 1990
from Jones' estimates of national effective protection rates, as summarized
in the zero-one dummy variable for countries with effective protection rates
above 40 percent used in Barro {l990bJ; from "business leaders"
perceptions of the business climate as reported in a collection of survey
evidence, the World Competitiveness Report; from the work of Agarwala
reported in the 1983 World Development Report, and from World Bank
assessments of the "outward" orientation of trade policy as reported in the
1987 World Development Report.
While many of the measures of trade orientation and distortions we
use suffer from being the subjective judgments of analysts who also know
about growth outcomes, we nevertheless prefer them to the use of trade
shares which we regard as relatively uninformative.18 Trade share measures
to a large degree pick up difference in national size and proximity to trading
partners. Suppose, for example, that Belgium and Holland merged. Would
the resulting entity be—in any interesting sense—less open and able to
exploit economies of scale than either country was previously?
The World Competitiveness Report surveyed business leaders around
the world, asking them to assess governmental policies and economic
environments in eighteen OECD and eight developing nations. We take
three "openness" variables from the World Competitiveness Report:
businessmen's assessments from the survey of the extent to which the
government's exchange rate policy is oriented toward keeping its industries
competitive exporters, the extent to which inward trade is free, and the
extent to which trade legislation supports businessmen who wish to export
as opposed to those who fear competition from imports.
18Asusedin,for example. Romer 119891.investment andGrowth 22 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
Table ill
Productivity Growth and Equipment Investment with
Alternative Distortion Measures
Additional Equip. sharclquip. shw-c CoQflIceni of
variable (w/o acid. var.l(w add. var.) acid. var. n(RMSE)
Barbone (1988/
Coefficient in 0.033 (>032 0.001 17 0.633
openness regrmJlotl >0.089) O.093> 0.(109) 40.006)
World Competitiveness Report
Euch. rate policy (1.229 0.246 .11.114(1 260300
Compel. ,ailed (0.0844 >0.0864 d).001)
Free Extent ci (4.24)2 1)114(2 11.192
Inward Trade iti.092( )lI4l(I2i
Trade Lcgislaiion (4.127 11(14(7 (1.178
Outward Oriented (i.I1'4( p >4) (441 cli 414)>)
Jones(Barro 11990b/J
Eff. pit >40 patent 0.335 0.161 -0.0) I 22 0.788
higb pdy. sansle >0.05(14 >0.052) (0.004) (0.006>
Effective prOtection 0.286 (1.2(1') -0.01 I 43 0.448
rale>4Opercal 40.068) (0.066) >0.004) 411.010)
World Development Report 1983 (Agariiola)
Exchange ratea 0.165 0.08) .0.0)0 26 0.270
pricing d(swnion 40.178) 10.165) 10.004) (0.012)
Potectjon of manu- 0.183 .0.007 0.169
facturing disto.iion (0.173) 40.004) (0.013)
Capital pCClng 0332 -0.011 0.209
disortion 40)91) (0.006) (0.013)
Labor pncing 0.171 .11.006 0.230
distortion 4))(66) >0.0(13> tO,013j
Distortionindex1' III>)>) .41(1114 ((.33)
value li.(55i ((((Op (0.0)24
Distortion index 44.205 .4(1)1(1 (1.366
ranking >0.151) U).l1(13i 4)1.0)))
World Developnsent Report 1987
Outward traié 0.141 0.153 0.0)) 32 0.414
oriented 1963-1973 (0.1834 0.1.15) 40.003) (0.012)
Outward trade 0.107 0.0(2 0.4214
oriented 1973-1985 i().l.US( 411(1413) (0.012)
uI)isl00 nidicca range 0cm I to 3 (or low. modecaic. and hiph dislotisons.
bAvecqe of the above distortions plus three more: agriCUllurlil proicelioli. tariff, and tnftation
disloilions.
cRatiges from 1 to 4 on a scale Croci slriwgly ouiward oriened to sirohigly itiward orie,iied.Investment and Growth 23 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
In the World Competitiveness Report sample, none of the three
variables enters our growth equation significantly, and inclusion of each of
the three does not materially affect the coefficient on equipment quantities.
The failure of the World Competitiveness Report "openness" variables to
reduce the coefficient on equipment investment gives us some confidence
that equipment investment is not simply a proxy for distortions that work
against the interests of exporters. These two sets of "openness" variables
have the substantial virtue of not having been constructed in the context of
studies advocating free trade.
Regressions using the Barbone openness estimates for OECD
countries give no signs that our equipment variables are proxies for
openness or trade-reducing distortions. The residuals from his modified
gravity model are ineffective as an independent variable in our growth
equation. And the coefficient of the equipment quantity variable is
unaffected. Regressions using the Jones high effective protection rate
dummy variable show that in both the larger and high productivity samples
inclusion of the variable reduces the equipment investment coefficient by
1/4, and that nations with a high effective protection rate see economic
growth lower by a significant 1.1 percent per year.
The Agarwala sample is not a favorable one for our basic regressions.
It contains a set of poor nations for which our specifications work relatively
badly, and for which the data are least reliable. In the Agarwala sample our
basic equipment share regressions produce a coefficient half as large, with a
standard error three times as large, as in our basic specification.
Nevertheless, five of the six Agarwala measures increase the equipment
coefficient when they are included in the regression. Only the exchange rate
distortion index appears to pick up a significant part of the equipment
investment share variable.
The World Bank sample is also a poor one for our basic specification
—producing an equipment share coefficient of 0.242 with a standard errorInvestment and Grotih 24 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
of 0.183. The World Bank's "outward orientation" measure enters the
regression significantly—the more outward oriented, the faster growth—
and halves the equipment coefficient when included. The World Bank's
trade orientation measure does capture a significant fraction of the factors
captured by our equipment variable, in much the same way as the Agarwala
exchange rate distortion variable does; the coefficient on the equipment
share is reduced by about half.
TableIV
Productivity Growth and Disaggregated Investment 1960—85
Non-
LaborforceGDP/wkrEquip. equip. Machine0 Elect.Struct.Trans. R2
Erpwth gapshareshoresharesharesharesharen (RMSE)
highPrudtactiviiSarnsle
-0.002 0.030 0337 -0.015 250.662
(0.146) (0.009)(00541(0.033) (0.008)
0.044 0.036 0.284 -0.004 0.332250.675
(0.141) (0.009)(O.O(,3) (0.028)(0.237) (0.008)
009b 0.343 .0.021 0.106 25 0.4.89
(0.184) (0.013)(0.079) (0.041)(0.301) (0.009)
0.004 0.034 -0.009 0.202 0.7 IS 250.732
(0.130) (0.0081 (0.029)(0.072)(0.160) (0.007)
0.015 0.035 0.199 O.666-0.009 0.109 250.719
(0.135) (0.009) (0.071)(0.203)(0.030)(0.249) (0.007)
Larger Sample
-0.031 0.020 0.265 0.062 61 0.291
(0.198) (0.009)(0.065)(0.075) (0.013)
-0.005 0.021 (1.29) ((.1174 -0(1786) 0.310
(0.1%) (0.000)(0.075) lOws))(((.273) (0.0(3)
0.056 ooosb 0.295 0.0.56-((.2)2 61 0.234
(0.210) (0(818)(0.0*2) (0.077)(0.2(8) (0.034)
-0.053 0.022 0.064 0.136 0.562 61 0.308
(0.197) (0.009) (0.034)(0.107)(0.204) (0.0(3)
-0.049 0.021 0)52 ().637 0.07) -0.237 61 0.307
(0.197) (0.009) (0.110)(0.2(9)(0.09)))(0.350) (0.0)3)
•Dnaggregaced s.laarcs wca cTeaicduuing(he same procedurea.s for (lie eqUipmefli uharc intable I.
bRrmsIoil uses975GDP perwor(agap inscad of 1%)) gap.
i1.3(alistic on difference between c(ectrical equlprnen(andnoii-c(cclrical niachmery coefficients equals
'.95.
4T-Mataslic on diffcncc between elecS-ucal equipment and iota-electric,) machinery coefficiaits equals
1.67.Investment and Growth 25 Fri. Oct 5, 1990
We are not sure how to interpret this association between the World
Bank's outward orientation measure and our equipment investment
measures. Korea, for example, which the World Bank treats as strongly
outward oriented, has not attained its outward orientation by keeping
relative prices free, but has sought instead to promote and heavily subsidize
heavy and export industry.19 It may well be that promoting equipment
investment and spurring export growth go hand in hand.2°
E. Components of Invest,nent
Table IV reports results using different disaggregations of investment.
When producers' transportation equipment is considered separately from
the "other investment" aggregate, its coefficient is large—albeitimprecisely
estimated—for the high productivity sample when the initial 1960 GDPper
worker gap is used as a control. When the mid-sample GDPper worker gap
is used, or when the larger 61 country sample is considered,producers'
transportation equipment has a much weaker relationship to growth than
either electrical machinery or non-electrical equipment.
Our decision to consider as our primary "equipment" measure the
aggregate of electrical and non-electrical machinery excluding producers'
durable transportation equipment isopen to question. The fifth line of each
panel of table IV contains the finest disaggregation of investment. In the
high productivity sample, electrical and non-electrical machinery each help
to forecast growth when the other is in the regression; structures and
transport equipment do not.
In the larger sample, electrical machinery and non-electrical
19SeeCollins and Park[19871.The 1987 World Development Report both holds Korea up as one ofa
very few examples of "strongly outward oriented" nations and critiques its governments for having
interfered heavily in relative prices and so reduced growth rates.
20TabIe V below presents some regressionssuggesting that this may indeed be the case and that
equipment investment and the World Development Reportoutwardorientation measures are strong
complements. However, equipment investment and a low Jones effective protection rate measure
appear to be. if anything. substitutes.Investment and Growth 26 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
machinery are the only components with t-statistics greater than one and
positive signs, and itisnot possible to reject the null that their coefficient
are the same. We do not believe that any of our substantive results depend
on the exclusion of producers' transportation equipment from our
equipment aggregate, or on the grouping of electrical and non-electrical
machinery.21
We suspect that attempting to refine the analysis and estimate different
effects on growth of the different components of equipment pushes beyond
the information that the data reliably contain. Our exploration of the
separate effects on growth of electrical machinery and non-electrical
equipment produced somewhat puzzling results. On the one hand, as table
4 shows the quantity of electric machinery has a more potent impact on
growth than the non-electric machinery component. On the other hand, we
have found that electrical machinery prices are less related to growth than
non-electrical equipment prices—the fastest growing nations are those that
have the lowest non-electrical equipment prices, not the lowest electrical
machinery prices.22 We therefore settle on our "equipment" variable.
F.Interaction Terms
Itis possible that the marginal impact of equipment investment differs
systematically with the rate of equipment investment or with the values of
other potential independent variables. Romer [1989], in his discussion of
the determinants of growth, places great emphasis on evidence using total
investment that the apparent marginal product of investment declines as
nations grow richer and increases as their export share increases.
21 many industries electrical machinery and non-electrical machinery are very strong
complements; efficient production requires both.
22We report some of the disaggregated relative investment price regressions we have performed in
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TableV
Productivity Growth and Interaction Terms
Er:,e,neMar&,na/ Effect of
LaborGDI' per Non— Equipmes;slni-esgnjenj io.
Interactionforce workerIquip.equip. Interaciion I'UVIM'lut RiM1ei R2
variable growth gal, share ,.harc lerin counLrvcountryn (RMSE)
high Pioduenvir,'Sample
GDP gap 60-0.029 -0.028 -0. 30 -0.030 0.777 0.445-0. 436 25 0.670
O. 446; 0(448; 0392) 11.035l().617 l0.103j0.392) 0.003)
GDP gap 75 -0.074 -0.087 -0.399 (((XiS 162) ((.65)-0.399 25 0.683
U). 146; (0.1131) (0.220; (0.033; (0.406> (1). (IX); (0.226) (0.007)
Equipment 0.029 0.04) 0.811 0.0)8 -3.680 0.698-0.089 25 0.706
share ;o.137; (0.0(0; 0.242, (0.035) (1.8411 (0.187) (0.2(9; (0.007)
Negative of 0096 0.040 0.156 -0.002 -0.219 0.1560.375 22 0225
Jones EPR (0.136; (0.007) (0.069) (0.027;(0(05) (0.069) (0.1)4) (0.006)
Larer Sample
GDP gap 60-0.039 0.015 0.207 0.060 0.078 0.2820.207 6) 0279
(0.204) (0.026) (0.291> (0.037)(0.373; (((.280> (0.29); (0.0(3)
GDP gap 75 0.017 -0.003 (1(47 0.1)48 (4.172 0.3)60.147 61 0229
0.2)8; 0.1)2)1; 02(0; (0)37 ((.293 ;(I.I 19) ,0.204; (0.014)
Equipment -0.027 ((.0)9 0i77 11.4th) )i.0)l ((.353((.196 6) 028)
share (0.200; (0.010) 0.2411 (1)035)((.813) ))).252j(1)93; (0.013)
Negative of 0208 0.035 0.495 0.048 -0.1)27 0.1950222 43 0.433
Jones EPR (0.218; 0.009) (0)0(1 )0.036 10.146) 10.101; (0.141) (0.010)
Outward -0.272 0.036 -0.256 0.06) 0.2050.0020.563-0.051 32 0.46)
oriented 63—73 (0.38); (0.024) (fl.264 (0.047) (0.112) (0.1)06)(0.265) (0.178) (0.0)2)
Outward -0.139 0.045 -0.288 0.036 0.211 00050.556-0.077 32 0.482
oriented 73—83 (0.359) (0.023) ((1.247; (0.047)(0.409; (0.007) (0.27)) (0.468) (0.011)
'These iwo columns give (he increase in growth produced by a iiaca.se in equipment inveStment for (he euiremecountries inthe sample: the first column applies to the poorest, with the lowest equlpmen( investmciit, nt the roost outward onented (wtucb
have the highest marginal effort of equlpmmii lnveslnieni oil growth; nation: the second column applies to the ridiesi, with the
luZhe,t equipment investment, or he most inward oriented nation in the sample.
Table V adds quadratic equipment terms and the interactions between
investment and the initial GDPgap, the WDR openness rating, and the Jones
effective protection rate (EPR) dummy from Barro[1990bJ to our basic
specifications. The results are, unfortunately, inconclusive. There issomeInt'est,nent alulGro%'t/l 28 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
evidence in the high productivity sample that the impact of additional
investment on growth declines with the initial GDP per worker level,
though the result fails to be statistically significant when the 1960 GDP per
worker gap is used (although substantively it is very significant). There is
also some evidence for decreasing returns to equipment investment. The
(investment)2 term is substantively significant for the high productivity
sample.
But the patterns found in the high productivity sample are not robust
to sample expansion. In the larger sample the interaction of GDP per worker
and equipment investment is statistically and substantively insignificant.
Moreover, the interaction of equipment investment with itself changes sign
in our basic specification. We find very attractive the idea that a high social
product of equipment investment reflects technology transfer mediated
through capital goods, and thus that the social product is higher for poorer
countries with more of a technology gap to bridge. But the data do not
speak reliably enough on this point for us to be willing to do more than
point out that the question is intriguing and potentially very important, and
the evidence not conclusive.
The interaction of a high Jones effective protection rate dummy
variable from Barro [1990b} and equipment investment similarly produces
different patterns in the two samples. And in the high productivity sample, it
appears that it is strongly protectionist, not open countries that benefit most
from equipment investment.
This does not fit the fact that the interaction of equipment investment
and the WDR trade orientation, for those developing nations with available
data, is significant and important: the most outward oriented nations appear
to be those that benefit the most from an increase in the equipment
investment share. It is necessary to be both outward oriented and to have a
high equipment investment share in order to achieve rapid growth. And the
estimated coefficients imply that the most inward oriented nations would
not benefit at all from increased equipment investment. High rates ofInvestment andGrowth 29 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
equipment investment appear tocomplement, not substitute for an outward
orientation as the WorldDeveloptnent Reportdefinesit. Itis somewhat
puzzling that they do not also appear to complement a low effective rate of
protection.
IV. Does Equipment Investment Cause Productivity Growth?
The relationship between equipment investment quantities and
economic growth appears relatively robust, in that equipment investment
does not appear to be proxying for some other widely recognized
determinant of growth. This section takes up the question of whether the
relationship between equipment investment and growth is causal.
One reason to believe that equipment investment causes growth, rather
than that growth causes investment, is that if growth caused investment we
would expect to see similar associations between equipment and structures
investment and growth. Rapid economic growth certainly raises the quasi-
rents earned by investments in equipment to establish and entrench market
positions, but it also raises the rents earned by structures. Favorably located
land is in fixed supply and larger structures economize on the use of such
land, and so one might imagine that faster economic growth would tend to
shift the use of savings away from producers' equipment and toward
structures. Yet it is equipment, not investment and not structures, that is
associated with rapid growth in our sample.
In this section we provide additional evidence against the hypothesis
that equipment investment and growth are both driven by some third
variable—that the same favorable conditions that raise productivity growth
might also encourage equipment investment without equipment investment
playing an essential direct role—in four further steps. First, we examine the
association between equipment investment and thecomponents of GDP
growth driven by productivity growth and labor force growth; we find aInvestment and Groiih 30 Fri, Oct 5,1990
much closer relationship between productivity growth and equipment
investment than between productivity growth and labor force growth; this is
hard to reconcile with a viewpoint that holds that increasing GDP drives
equipment investment. Second, we consider timing evidence. Third, we
consider the joint behavior of equipment prices and quantities; we regard
this as the strongest of the pieces of evidence—fast growth goes with high
quantities and low prices of equipment investment, and this is not easy to
reconcile with the belief that the high quantity of equipment investment in
rapidly growing countries is due to some other factor that has both caused
fast growth and shifted the demand curve for equipment investment
outward. Fourth, we consider the effects of alternative instruments for the
equipment quantity variable; if the association between growth and
investment were due to some additional factor causing both, it would be
surprising if that additional factor were closely associated with all of the
different instruments we use.
A. Equipment Investment and the Components of Total GDP Growth
If the association between equipment investment and growth arose
from some sort of accelerator mechanism, and equipment investment was a
consequence and not a cause of growth, one would expect both increasesin
productivity and increases in the labor force to lead to increased equipment
investment. Table VI reports regressions, for both the high productivity and
the larger samples, with equipment investment on the left hand side and
with the two different components of GDP growth—the rate of growth of
GDP per worker, and the rate of growth of the labor force—on the right
hand side as well as our standard control variables of the 1960 GDP per
worker gap and the share of GDP devoted to other types of investment.
Table VI shows that equipment investment is strongly positively associated
with increases in GDP that come from increasing productivity, and
negatively associated with increases in GDP that come from increasing the
labor force holding productivity constant. The t-statistic on the differenceIin'estment and Growth 31 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
between the productivity growth and the labor force coefficients is more
than 3 for the larger sample and more than 5 for the high productivity
sample.
TableVI
Equipment Investment and the Components of Total GOP Growth
OtherGDP/ Lubor
investment wkr.GDP/wkr.force R2
Sample sharern growtherowlh n(RMSE)
Hugh producluvily0.073 -0.063 .965 -0.176 25 0.645
sample ((1.078) (11.1123) i().714 ((1.351 (0.019)
Larger sample 0.070 -0.033 0.858 -0.361 61 0371
(0.064) (0.0)7) 10.211) 0.354j 1)1.1)23)
TableVI is thus an additional piece of evidence against the claim that
our results arise because rapid growth leads naturally to rapid investment
through an accelrator mechanism. Rapid total GDP growth driven by
increasing productivity is closely associated with high equipment
investment. Rapid total GDP growth driven by an increasing labor force is
not. It is hard to reconcile this differential association of equipment
investment with intensive and extensive growth without invoking a causal
role for equipment investment in producing productivity growth.
B. Timing
If some unobserved attribute—perhaps national culture, or the
structure of institutions—causes rapid productivity growth, there is the
possibility that it would also induce an increase in equipment investment.
In this case the association and equipment investment and growth would be
driven by some deeper country-specific attribute. If such an attribute is
persistent, a plausible proxy would be past growth rates. Table VII
therefore adds growth over the 1960-1975 period to equations relating
1975-1985 growth to equipment for both our high productivity and full
samples. The inclusion of past growth does not add much explanatoryInvestment and Growth 32 Fri,Oct5, 1990
power.The impact of equipment investment on growth is only marginally
affected.
TableVII
1975—1985 Productivity Growth as a Function of Lagged




Lsb. Ice. GI)P/wr. Iquip.equip. GDP/wIr. R2
Snecifleationerpwth can share harccrowth n (RMSE)
high Pr.i4tiiily Sample
Cunna eq. shcs -0)7? 0.0)4 0.42$ ((047 250.428
10.238) 10.0161 010$) (0(159) i((.013)
Curreja eq. harcs -0174 0.015 (1447 0(144 •Olk,0 250.400
(0.264) (0.0(6) (0.1321 (((.062) (0.2)8) (0.013)
Lagged eq. n)wes -0.056 03(18 0.3') 04(27 250.449
(0.264) (((MIS) (0.1)96) 10.051) 0.013)
Lagged eq. ,hare,-(I (151 (((((1) 1I.3•) IUI'(, .11.1)71) 250.42)
(0.27)) (11.0(01 (II.) I8 )0ul4) 0.2(171 (0.013)
Laigr . ample
Currl eq. s1es -0.372 0.1(26 ((.29) (1112 (.10.192
(0.305) (0.1)12) ((1.10)1 (0(153) (0.020)
Current eq. shares .0.4)5 0.027 0.230 01198 ((.201610.196
(0.306) (0.0)2) (0.1(31 (0.054) ((1.178) (0.020)
Laggedeq.satares -0.421 0.0)0 0.1)7 -0.0)7 6)-0.0)8
(0.348) (0.013) (0.110) (0.057) (0.022>
Lagged eq. sliare .0.533 01116 ((.1144 -0.525 0.453610.086
(0.332) 10.013) (0.11)8) (0.054) (0.167) (0.02))
L.agged shares were constructed by mul(iplylng (he average ol !CP observations of the
equipmentsharesol inveutmenI by he Investment share oIGDP Iro,n 960 lo 1975. and then
averagngoveryears.
Table VII also replaces current equipment investment with an estimate
of the lagged investment share over 1960—1975 in the list of the
determinants of 1975—1985 growth. if high investment is a consequence and
not a cause of growth, it is hard to imagine how lagged investment could beInvestment and Groit'th 33 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
a better proxy for unobserved determinants of growth than lagged growth
itself. Lagged equipment investment is estimated by multiplying the total
investment share over 1960—1975 by ICP observations of the equipment
share of investment. This lagged equipment variable has strong predictive
power in the high productivity sample, and weak predictive power in the
larger sample. It has strong predictive power in the high productivity sample
even with 1960-1975 growth also included.23
C.EquipmentPrices andGrowth
FiguresVII and VIII plot the component of the equipment price
orthogonal to GDP per worker24 to growth rates, partialing out labor
growth, relative prices of other investment, and initial productivity for both
the full and high productivity samples. There is a strong negative
association between equipment prices and growth. We see the association of
growth with high quantities and low prices of equipment as strong evidence
that equipment investment drives growth. If high rates of investment were a
consequence rather than a cause of growth, one would expect that because
of strong demand the price of equipment would be high in rapidly growing
countries.
23Wehave also attempted to estimate fixed-effects models relating changes in equipment investment
rates to changes in growth rates without success. Our failure might be due to an errors-in-variables
problem arising from our lack of direct data on the equipment proportion of investment before 1975
for most countries.
24The "orthogonalized" equipment price used as the independent variable is the residual from log
real relative equipment price regressed on GDP per capita relative to the United States, measured in
international dollars. For nations covered in both the 1975 and 1980 ICP phases. the two observations
are averaged to obtain an estimate of the characteristic relative price structure in the post-World War
II period. Since equipment prices are markedly lower in richer countries, it is important to consider
only that portion of relative prices orthoQonal to the country level of GDP per worker. If we used
the unadjusted and not the orthogonalized' equipment price in a reiression, ii would be close to
including the end of sample period level of GDP per worker as an independent variable. Since the
beginning of sample period level of GDP per worker has already been included as an independent














Partial Scatter of Growth and Equipment Prices, AU Countries
Fast growth would shift demand to the right, and move the economy
upward and outward along the equipment supply curve. Instead, growth is
associated with a move down and to the right in an equipment price-
Figure VII
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quantity graph, suggesting that supply is shifting out in high-growth
countries and moving the economy along the equipment demand curve.25
The relationship between equipment prices and growth is explored in
more detail in Table VIII, which reports equations relating equipment prices
and growth for both our samples. The relationship between equipment
prices and growth is almost as robust as the relation between quantities and
growth for the high productivity sample. It is less robust for the larger 61
nation sample. Many African countries, including Ethiopia, Madagascar,
Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zambia, report low real producers' equipment
prices, and yet have exhibited disappointing long run productivity growth
rates.
In large part, low equipment prices operate to promote growth by
increasing the quantity of equipment investment. As Table IX shows, when
equipment investment is included in the productivity equation the
coefficient on equipment prices declines, and is never both significant and
negative. This bears on the "liberalization" hypothesis discussed above. If
high equipment investment's large coefficient in a growth regression arose
because it proxied for the presence of a laissez faire attitude towards trade,
one would expect the equipment price variable, a 1irect measurement of
distortions, to be a more important determinant of growth than the
equipment quantity.
D.Alternative Sources ofVuiriation in Equipmentinvestment
Theevidence in the previous subsection suggested that low equipment
prices are associated with rapid subsequent productivity growth, and that the
mechanism through which the association operates is high rates of
equipment investment; we now consider various sources of variation in
equipment investment, and their impact on productivity growth. More
25The association between low prices and growth does not arise because high investment makes it
possible to take advantage of economies of scale in production. A high fraction of equipment—30
percent—is imported even in the United States. In Colombia. 80 percent of equipment is imported.Investment and Grmi'i/i 36 Fri,Oct5, 1990
generally,an assertion that differences in equipment investment cause
differences in productivity growth is a claim that changes in equipment
investment, however engineered, will influence growth. The next best thing
to direct experimental evidence is to examine whether different sources of
variation in equipment have similar impacts on growth. To do this, we
instrument equipment investment with a number of alternative variables and
check whether its estimated impact changes. This procedure can be viewed
as an informal Hausman-Wu test of the proposition that equipment
investment can be treated as an exogenous variable.
TableVIII
Productivity Growth and Equipment Prices
Lab. Ice. GDPIwkr.Fat. mv. Equip.i
Period rpwth gap rate price n (RMSE)
l!i,'h Prodi,ciiviiy Sample
1960-1985 0.00.1 04)2)) ('.050 -0.024 25 0.4(4
(0.192) (0.0)2) (0.077) (0.009) (0.0)0)
1960-1973 0.049 0.045 0.008 -0.005 25 0.428
(0.212) (0.014) (0.004) (0.0(4) (0.0(2)
(970-1985 0.040 .0.007 0.031 -0.033 25 0.404
(0.198) (0.013) (0.040) (0.01(1) (0.011)
1975-1985 -0.061 -0.006 0(04 -0.023 25 0309
(0.288) (0.016) (0.056) (0.0(3) (0.0(4)
Lar,erSample
1960-1985 -0.086 0.0(7 0.099 -0.004 61 0.181
(0.213) (0.0(0) (0.030) ((((8)7) (((.0)4)
(960-1975 -0.073 0.011 0,18)7 .0.11)5 1.) ((.1 (9
(0.239) 10.012) ((((8)2) 1) (8(S) (((.1(17)
1970-1983 -((.003 ((.02) 0(13 1)18)1 6) 0(57
(0.245) (0,0)1) )0.W(6( (((.000) ((1,11)7)
1975.1985 -0.393 0.025 0)46 ((.118, I,) (((38
(0.3(7, ()(.013( (0.1(44) (((.18(9) 0.02))
Lar err .Samj;leniihBarr,,Correlates
(960-1985 0.003 0.040 0.059 -0(8)9 6) 0.290
(0.2191 (1)0(4) (0.0351 (0(8)7) (((.0(3)
(960.1973 ((.029 ((.032 ((.03-I .0.11(6II ((.257
(0.234) (((.0(7) (0.1(76) ((((8(9) (((.0)5)
(970-1985 -0.224 0.034 (1.109 -0.18)1 61 ((.163
(0.284) (01)181 11.0471 (((.18(9) (((.0(7)
1975-(985 -0.555 0.034 0.146 0.01 ( 61 (1.159
(0.365) (0.0(9) (0.052) (0.0(I) (0.020)
*Theequipmentprice usedis(heaverage ofIhO( componen)of(he (975 and 1980 ICP
observations orthogonal to GDP perworker.For countries where (here was no 1975 pncc (he
1980 orthoeonalized price was used alone, and vice versaInvestment and Growl/i 37 Fri,Oct5, 1990
Table IX
Productivity Growth, Equipment Quantities, and Equipment Prices
Labor Non-
force. GDP/wkr Equip.Equip.equip. R2
Period growthcap once share share n (RMSE)
high ProductivitySarnplv
1960-1985 -0008 0033 0.007 0.354 -0.0(8 25 0.651
(0.149) 10.1(1(0 (11.1)11) (((3(92) (0.1134) (0.008)
1960—975 -0.05I (1.1)51 II.)))), ((3?)) .0(04) 25 ((.471)
((.201 (11.1)14)(0(1(5) l1I.I?O 1)1.045) (((.011)
1970-1985 -0.026 (1.1(14 .03012 11.561 -((.024 25 1>572
0.171, (((.1)131 0.0(3,(0.1(8, (((.1)39) (OAXI')(
1975-1985 -0.229 0(120 0.0(2 9.523 (1.04)) 25 0405
(0.279) (11.0)9) (0(12 I, (0.205) (((40,2) (0.1(13)
l.aier Sample
1960-1985 -0.033 0.028 ((.0(5 ((.41(4 11.0506) 0.3)8
(((.194)(0.0(0, ((1.10)9) (((.101) (0.1)35) (0.1)13)
1960-1975 -0.057 0.1)11 -(3 (014 ((.149 01(41) 6) ((.079
(0.245)((((((3)(((.0(2)(0.129) (0.046) (0.0(71
1970-1985 -0.145 0.034 0.024 0.453 0.052 61 0.257
(0.231) (0.011)(0.011)(0.117) 0.042( (0.016)
1975-1985 -0.551 0.044 0.041) 0470 0.078 61 0295
(0.290) (0.013) 10.013)(0.155) (0.051) (0.019)
Larger Sample with Ijarro Correlates
1960-1985 .0.0)7 0.042 ((.0)) 0.377 0.028 61 0.397
(0.202) (0.013) (0.009)(0.09) 0.037) (0.0(2)
1960-1975 0.023 0.1135 .0.Iou ((.21(7 -II 10)1 61 0.256
(9.21-8) 10.0171 (0.011) (11.1291 (0.044) (0.0(5)
1970-1985 -0.292 ((.1146 (1.023 ((.472 11.036 01 (1.283
0.203) ((1.0(7,(.(I(2, 10,1211 11(141,j (1)0(6)
1975-1985 -II 743 ((((4') ((((44 ((.65') (.0036) (1.312
(0.3341 (0.010) ((1(114) ((1.162) (0.050) (0.0(8)Investment and Groi'th 38 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
TableX
Productivity Growth and Equipment Investment Instrumented with Equipment Prices,
Savings Rates, and World Competitiveness Report Trade Orientation Variables
LaborGDPI Non-
Instruments Force Wkr. Equip.Equip.
Used GrowthGal' Share Share n
I/ui/i P,odiuiiitvSample
OLS .0(8.1' 0.030 0.337 -001 25 ((.062
(0. 4( (((.11(91 ((.054 (((((311
Equip. Prices .11(16* ((1(1) ((.1 I) .11.11.1,1
0.1581 (((.181')) 1).))),) (11.04 I
OLS 0.11(9 0.032 (1.33') -(1.1117 24 0.667
10.149) (0.0(191 11(1(551 (0.1)331
Savings Raic 0.1(8) (LOS) 0.505 .0019 0506
(0.2061 (0.011) (0.1911 (11.047)
OLS 0.092 0.042 ((.161 -((.0)') 18 0.06!
((1.153) ((1.18)3) (O.079( (I.((45
WCR V&.ah)es -0.009 (((Wi ((.1)14 -((.103 0.480
(0.3421 (0.11141 (0.2)51 1(1.2981
Larie Sample
OLS -0.031 0.020 0.265 0.062 6) 0.29)
(0.198) 0.009, (0.1(65) (0.1(35)
Equip. Prices -0.112 ((.016 11.180 0.043 0.257
(0.2091 (0.01(1) (((.1(85) 10.1)46)
OLS -0.029 01)20 (1.265 ((.062 61) 0.291
(0.2011 ((((8)91 (0.066) (0.1(35)
Savings Rale -0.248 (1.1.111 .1) (62 ((.131
((.643) (0.11611) (11731 l).5))
013 0.161 ((((34 ((.22') 11)11 2(1 (1.503
10.1651 (((.1817) (((.1(54) (((((SIll
WCR Variables 0.440 ((.1)34 ((.26(1 0.298
(0.479) )l.0I5 (11.321)) (((.1711
Forboth the high productivity and full samples, Table X reports OLS
estimates of the relation between equipment investment and growth, along
with estimates obtained by instrumenting with equipment prices, with rates
of national saving, and with measures of trade liberalization. The results for
the high-productivity sample are supportive of a causal relation between
equipment investment and growth. The coefficient using either prices or the
national saving rate as an instrument is close to that obtained using OLS.
Using World Competitiveness Report survey measures of trade orientationInvestment and Growth 39 Fri. Oct 5, 1990
as an instrument yields an imprecise estimate of the impact of equipment on
growth, lower by six percentage points than the OLS estimate in the high
productivity sample.
The results for the larger sample are almost as strong. Instrumenting
equipment with its price or with the WCR survey variables yields results
that are similar to the OLS results, although the WCR-instrumented
coefficient is once again imprecise. However, the coefficient turns negative
(with an enormous standard error) in the full sample when national saving
rates are used as an instrument.26
Five out of six regressions produce no material difference when the
equipment investment coefficient is estimated by instrumental variables
rather than by ordinary least squares. It is easy to construct arguments that
the instruments used here are endogenous. This makes the similarity of the
estimates obtained with different instruments to each other and to the OLS
estimates more surprising. The different components of variation in
equipment investment associated with equipment prices, with the nominal
savings rate, and with the WCR variables all have the same association with
the rate of growth. Such similarity would be a remarkable coincidence
unless the association between equipment investment and growth is the
result of structural causation running from equipment to growth.
V.Implications and Conclusions
Wethink that this paper makes a persuasive case for a strong
association between equipment investment and growth. The relationship
between rates of equipment investment and growth is very different from
the relationship between structures investment and growth. It accounts for a
substantial part of the variation in rates of growth. While there are a few
26Perhaps national saving is a poor instrument for equipment investment in low income countnes.
giventheimportance of net capital inflows.Int'estinent and Growth 40 Fri. Oct 5, 1990
anomalies, we suspect that the results are very robust by the standards of
research on cross-country growth. Tests of robustness performed here have
been more extensive than in other efforts—for example, Romer [198911—to
draw conclusions about investment-growth correlations. Given the small
number of observations, the large number of independent variables, and the
poor quality of much data underlying the larger sample regressions,
anomalies are inevitable. What is of interest is not that some specifications
do not support our interpretation, but that many do.
A. Comparisons with Other Work
Our findings raise a number of questions. First, can they be
reconciled with earlier research, especially research downplaying the role of
capital accumulation? Research in the growth accounting tradition has
assumed away the possibility of external effects from accumulation. But
studies which took a more catholic viewpoint have also tended to downplay
links between accumulation and growth. Dowrick and Nguyen [19891, for
example, analyzed a sample close to our high productivity sample, yet
found a coefficient of growth on the total investment share of only 0.12 or
so.
We believe that many previous studies have been carried out at an
inappropriate level of aggregation. We see no reason to expect that
investments in structures should carry with them the same external effects
as plausibly attach to investments in equipment. We are not awareof
previous work that has separated the components of aggregateinvestment
and studied their differential impacts on growth in a cross section of nations.
Given the clear differences in the composition of investment depicted in
Figure IV, it is not surprising that studies that have focused ontotal capital
accumulation have understated the potential contribution of investment to
growth.
One series of studies that has led to conclusions qualitatively similar
to ours is the research project of Jorgenson [1988, 1990]. Jorgensoninvestment andGrowth 41 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
estimates sectoral production functions and uses them for sophisticated and
highly disaggregated growth accounting exercises. He finds substantial
complementarity between equipment investment on the one hand and total
factor productivity growth on the other. In most industries technological
change is capital using: at given prices, isoquants with higher levels of total
factor productivity lead to higher ratios of capital to labor (a point made for
the nineteenth century by David [1977]).
Jorgenson thus finds a larger role for equipment investment in
supporting productivity growth than is found in growth accounting work
using aggregate production functions. The relative shares of industries differ
across countries and since the magnitude of the capital using bias in total
factor productivity growth may well not be independent of the level of
productivity. Qualitatively, however, his stress on the importance of
disaggregation in measuring capital inputs is the same as ours.
B. Equipment Investment and Aggregate Production Functions
Before seeking explanations involving external economies for our
findings, it is important to ask whether they can be reconciled with the
presence of a standard neoclassical aggregate production function and the
restriction that capital is paid its marginal product. In neoclassical models
steady-state growth rates are independent of investment rates. However,
investment rates may influence growth rates as shifts in investment rates
cause economies to transit between steady-state growth paths. Moreover,
since equipment and structures have different depreciation rates, the
neoclassical model predicts that with equal net private rates of return there
will nevertheless be differences in the relationship between shifts in
investment shares and shifts in the rate of growth of gross output including
depreciation. This is the essential point behind Jorgenson's distinction
between the stock of capital and the flow of capital services.
To evaluate the potential magnitude of these effects, we calculated the
effects of increased equipment and structures investment on growth in GDPInvestment and Grov't/i 42 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
andNDP,over short and long runs. For simplicity, weassumed an
aggregatenet product production function with the form of:
(2) Y = (K +K )aLlce
eqa
We begin the economy in steady state growth with the rate of growth
of the effective labor force (n + g) equal to two percent per year, with the
initial shares of GDP devoted to equipment and structures investment at 7.5
percent each, and with the rate of depreciation on structures equal to 2
percent per year. We consider capital shares (a) of 40 and 60 percent, and
we consider depreciation rates on equipment (seq) of 15 and 25 percent. For
these various sets of parameter values, Table Xl reports the marginal impact
on growth rates in percentage points per year of a one percentage point shift
in the GDP share of equipment or structures investment.
TableXl
Effect of a One Percentage Point Shift in the Proportion of GDP Devoted to
Investment on Output Growth Rates
Perce,iiate Point Chant'e ui OutputGrotiih Rtnes
Oter /Year Oter 25 Yeats
Shiftin: CDI'NI)!' CDI'NI)I' Parameters
Equipment investment (1.23 015 0(1) ().(, a = 0.4 .q—0.15
StructuresInvestnpcltl 0.16 (1.16 0.14 0.13
Equipment mnvesmnient 0.39 Ii 27 (1.17 ((3 a 06 & = 0.15
Structures investment (5.211 (1.211 0.24 0.23
Equipmentiimvestnteutt 0.33 (1.6 0.l (1.1)5 a 0.4 S' = 0.25
Structures investment 017 (1.17 (1.15 014
Twoclear conclusions emerge. First, within the aggregate production
function framework it is not possible to account for an association between
investment and output growth of the magnitude suggested by the empirical
cross-country results. Even assuming a capital share of 60 percent, a Cobb-
Douglas production function produces a long-run effect of equipmentInvestment and Grot'th 43 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
investment on growth little more than half as large as our empirical
estimates support. Allowing for a lower elasticity of substitution in
production would reinforce this conclusion. So would recognizing that
differences in investment rates are persistent and that nations' capital/output
ratios had already diverged by 1960 because of differential previous
investment shares.
Second, the simulations illustrate that in the long run neoclassical
models predict that increases in the share of output devoted to gross
structures investment rather than equipment investment should have the
most potent effect on growth. The effect of a once and for all shift Meq in
the equipment investment share asymptotically changes the equipment
capital/output ratio by:
(3) •—1 = eq
YJ n+g+&
andsimilarly for a shift in structures investment. Because structures have a
lower depreciation rate, adding to structures investment ultimately raises
capital intensity and therefore gross output more than adding to equipment
investment. A given increase in structures investmen1 corresponds, in the
long run, to a larger increase in cumulative net investment than does a given
increase in the equipment investment rate. This pattern is even more
apparent in net than in gross product growth.
C.Social Returnsto Investment
We therefore interpret our results as suggesting that the private return
to equipment investment is below the social return, and that the social return
to equipment investment is very high. This raises the question of how to
move from our coefficient estimates to estimates of the social returns to
equipment investment.
We believe .hat our coefficients understatethetrue social return to
equipment. Consider economies moving along steady-state paths as inlnvestnent and Growth 44 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
Solow [1956]. A regression of growth on capital formation will yield a zero
coefficient even though capital has a positive rate of return. The negative
correlation between the level of and rate of return to investment biases the
coefficient on investment down below the rate of return in the average
countly.
To formalize this argument, consider a cross-section of nations i in
each of which the marginal social product of net investment is ri, so that:
(4) = r'(I-&K)
Theaverage growth rate of output g1 over the sample is:
(5) g = r{ON) - (KiY)'}
where(I/Y)i and (K/Y)i without time subscripts are the average investment
shares of national product and capital output ratios over the sample period
in country i. Writing i and k* for averages across countries of investment
shares and capital/output ratios, and r* for the average social product of net
investment in the sample, the expected value of the coefficient 3 from the
cross country regression of growth rates on gross investment shares will be:
cov[r',(I/Y)'] cov[(K/Y)', (IIY)']
(6) = r + [i*k*] - r + (higher order terms...
var((I/Y)) var((I/Y))
Thesecond of the major terms in (6) shows that a negative correlation
between investment and social returns leads the coefficient to underestimate
the true return. Our interaction regressions suggest some diminishing
returns to investment, which would generate a negative cov[ri, (I/Y)i]. The
alternative is that some third factor shifts demand for equipment and leads
to high returns, high investment, and a positive cov[ri, (J/Y)i]. We discount
this possibility because of the association of high equipment investment andinvestment andGrowth 45 Fri,Oct5,1990
growth with low equipment prices.
We have used gross ratherthannet investment in this study; there is a
strong case that it is gross rather than net investment that matters for
productivity growth. If gross investment is the key determinant of growth,
then the third term in equation (6) is not present. But if net investment is the
relevant variable, then depreciation further biases the coefficient downward.
Depreciation appears in the third, the r*6(cov[K/Y, l/Y]/var(I/Y)) term in
equation (6). Countries that have a high capital/output ratio devote a large
share of national product to replacement investment. Differences in rates of
grossinvestmentcan be correlated with but overstate differences in rates of
net investment.
A factor in the other direction is that a unit of equipment investment
has an effect on output that does not come all in the first year but that
instead has some lag structure. If year-to-year output growth rates are
determined by a distributed lag on equipment investment like:
(7) =
Thenour cross section regression of average growth rates on average
equipment investment shares would produce a coefficient estimate greater
than the true social return to investment:
(8) EU3) = p. > (1 -d)'p
whered is the appropriate discount rate. We have little insight into the
relevant lag structure, but suspect that the rapid economic depreciation of
equipment implies that its effect on output has a relatively small mean lag.
D. Implications for Economic Policy
A point often made (for example, Krueger [1990]) against the position
that investment has a high marginal product is that India has had a highinvestment and Groii'rh 46 Fri, Oct 5,1990
savings rate—Krueger estimates that it has risen ftom 14 to 22 percent over
the post-independence period—and yet has exhibited poor growth
performance, so the key to growth is not so much the accumulation as the
effective use of resources. We would not disagree: India appears to bevery
close to the regression line relating equipment investment and productivity
growth depicted in Figure VI. India has a relatively high savings rate, but
equipment is expensive—more than twice as expensive in relative terms as
in Korea in 1980. As a result, equipment investment as a share of GDP is
about half of the sample average, even though Indian real non-equipment
investment as a share of GDP is slightly greater than the sample average.
From our standpoint according to which equipment investment is crucial,
India does not appear to have made good use of its high savings rate.
This argument—that it is not only the volume of savings but also
whether the savings are efficiently used to "buy" appropriate equipment—
may have a wide range of application. Another often cited counterexample
to the view that mechanization is the key to growth is the experience of
planned economies, which have emphasized equipment to the exclusion of
consumption and residences and grown slowly. These examples are not
clear cut—the Soviet Union in the 1950's and earlier appears to have seen
rapid growth in industrial production, especially in military goods, albeit at
the price of immense human misery. While our results suggest that high
rates of equipment investment may be necessary for rapid growth, we
certainly do not regard them as sufficient.
At a minimum, equipment must be directed to the most productive
uses. A growth strategy based on equipment investment must be market
conforming, not market replacing, to realize the very high social rates of
return on equipment investment that appear in the cross section of nations.
The strong interaction between equipment investment and outward
orientation in Table V may arise because an outward oriented economy
conforms to market forces, and does not try to replace them.
For these reasons, we interpret our results as implying that the socialInvestment and Growth 47 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
rate of return to equipment investment is 30 percent per year, or higher.
Much of this return is not captured by private investors. If these results
stand up to scrutiny, they have obvious implications. The gains from
raising equipment investment through tax or other incentives dwarf losses
from any non-neutralities that would result. A 20 percent wedge between
the social return to eQuipment and other investment has implications for all
policies affecting saving and capital allocation.
Ourfindingthat equipment investment is so important for growth
suggests an explanation for the striking differences in economic
performance realized by nations with "interventionist" governments that
have tried to jump start economic growth. From our perspective, the key
difference between countries ruled by "interventionist" governments in
South America and East Asia—despite the similarities in the rhetoric used
to justify intervention—lies in their quantities of equipment investment. All
the programs are all rationalized by similar appeals to "Schumpeterian"
rather than "Ricardian" advantage and to the crucial role of industry in
economic development (see, for example, Sheahan [1987] and Johnson
[1982]). But "industrial policies" in South America (aside from Brazil) and
Africa have for the most part turned out so badly, while activist
governments in East Asia have done well.
We suggest that the poor performers have confused support for
industrialization with support for industrialists. Policies that try to increase
the health of the equipment sector by enriching producing industrialists end
up raising prices and reducing quantities, and so are counterproductive—
even though existing industrialists are happy with such policies.
Frameworks that increase the quantity of equipment investment by
encouraging purchases appear to have been more successful. The
divergence between Latin American and East Asian outcomes and the
divergence in their relative quantity and price structures carries an important
insight into what a successful "industrial policy" is, and how it should be
implemented.Investment and Growth 48 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
E. Views of Economic Growth
Yet another question is what do these resultssayabout alternative
theories of economic growth. Beyond calling into question views which
overemphasize human capital accumulation through formal education, we
doubt that they help in choosing between alternative theoretical
formulations almost all of which allow for sometype of important external
economy. Instead they point out the importance of disaggregation. This
calls into question the utility of researchprograms directed at spelling out
alternative mechanisms driving all of aggregate growth insingle-good
models as if relative prices (and relative quantities) of differentproducts did
not matter. Economists' emphasis on single-good models is odd given that
these models offer almost no scope for the relative price effects economists
stress in most contexts.
Our exploration of the links between equipment investment and
growth leaves many questions unaddressed. Three sets of issues strike us as
particularly important. First, are our results an artifact of the particular
natural experiment we have studied? We have examined growth and
equipment investment during the post-World War II period which contains
the largest boom and the largest expansion of trade and manufacturing that
the world economy has ever seen. Would equipment investment have been
so strongly correlated with growth if, say, the post-World War II period had
been more like the interwar period, with falling commodity trade and
protectionist pressures generated by unemployment in the industrial core?
Some studies of the pre-World War II have been conducted (for example,
Abramovitz and David [1973]; Abramovitz [1986]; De Long [1988];
McLean and Nguyen [1989]), but they view growth from a highly
aggregative perspective, their data is unreliable, and much remains to be
done.
Second, just what is the right measure of externality generating
investment? X-ray machines and large turbine generators are both classifiedInvestment andGro%'th 49 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
as electrical machinery; oil drilling rigs and personal computers are both
classified as non-electrical machinery. Yet in each of these sets of goods
investment in one good may well have a very different impact on growth
than investment in the other. Much more disaggregated equipment
investment information is available in national income accounts data and
the ICP, but the problem of finding appropriate price deflators remains, and
plausible statistical procedures would soon run Out of degrees of freedom. It
may be possible to explore these issues using information on productivity at
the industry, firm, or regional level.
Third, how does equipment investment contribute to growth? As we
have just emphasized, aggregate production functions suggest much smaller
effects of equipment investment on growth than those that appear in the
post-WWII comparative cross section. Presumably some important external
economies operate. But we have little insight into exactly what they are, or
what their relative quantitative importance is.Investment and Groi'th 50 Fri, Oct5, 1990
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AppendixI: Spatial Correlation
Manycomparative cross country regressions have assumed that there
is no dependence across residuals, and that each country provides as
informative and independent an observation as any other. Yet it is difficult
to believe that Belgian and Dutch economic growth would ever significantly
diverge, or that substantial productivity gaps would appear within
Scandinavia. The omitted variables that are captured in the regression
residuals seem ex ante likely to take on similar values in neighboring
countries. This suggests that residuals in nearby nations will be correlated,
and that the sample contains less information than OLS regressions and
standard errors report.
To investigate the possibility and significance of spatial correlation
(Case, 1987), we formed, for all country pairs i and j, the product uiuj/2 of
the two fitted residuals from our basic regression on the high productivity
sample, normalized by the estimate of the residual variance. We then
regressed, using various functional forms, ujujJ2 on the distance ij (in
miles) between the capitals of nations i and j. An appendix table presents
the matrix of distances used.
The first functional form tried was:
E(u.u.)
(Al)
'= a + + c
a2 1 +X&
Ityielded an adjusted R2 of -.0003, an estimated a of -.974 (with an
uncorrected OLS reported t statistic of -11.69), and an estimated X of
.0095569 for every thousand miles (with an uncorrected OLS reported t
statistic of .76). The estimated correlation between residuals varies from .03
for countries with adjacent capitals to -.05 for countries with capitals 10,000
miles apart.
A second functional form tried was:Investment and Groi't/i 58 Fri. Oct 5, 1990
E(u.u.)
(A2) = a+exp[-A J + c
Italso produced an adjusted R2 less than zero and a small estimate of X.
The estimated c was -.97 1 (with an uncorrected OLS reported t statistic of -
11.96),and an estimated ? of .00969 for every thousand miles (with an
uncorrected OLS reported t statistic of .87). Once again, the estimated
correlation between residuals varies from .03 for countries with adjacent
capitals to -.05 for countries with capitals 10.000 miles apart.
The figure below plots the pairwise products of fitted residuals,
normalized by the residual variance, against the distance between national
capitals for the high productivity sample. There is a tendency for countries
located on opposite sides of the earth (Latin America and East Asia) to have
negatively correlated residuals, but the scatter is not supportive of the
hypothesis that neighboring countries have similar residuals.
FigureAl
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Afurther figure maps the fitted residuals from the high productivity//Ivestrnem and Groi'i/: 59 Fri, Oct 5,1990
sample, classifying them into four groups by whether they are positive and
negative and whether they are greater or less in absolute value than the
standard error of the estimate. The nations in the southern cone of South
America all have similar residuals, but the many European countries exhibit
no geographical pattern, and dominate the estimated coefficients in our
spatial correlation regressions.
FigureAll
Geographical Residual Distribution for the High-Productivity Sample
We are quite surprised at the apparent absence of a significant degree
of spatial correlation in our sample, for much discussion tends to speak of
economic growth in terms of regions sharing a common growth path: the
southern cone, East Asia, southern Europe, Scandinavia, and so on. The
absence of spatial correlation in the fitted residuals raises the possibility that
the factors that lead countries within a region to follow similar growth paths
work through the rate of equipment investment.
A table presents the matrix of distances between national capitals
used.Invest,nent and Growth 60 Fri. Oct 5, 1990
TableAl
Matrix of Distances Between National Capitals
Us
Luxembourg 6404 Lux
Canada 733 5869 Can
Denmark 6531 5926 Den
Venezuela 3302790639608392 Veri
Germany 6417 144 5869 660 7987 Ger
Norway 625011865616486 8315 1048Nor
U.K 5915 491 5379 958 7500 5121157 UK
Netherlands 6209 318 5651 623 1858 235 916 359 Ne
France 6180 288 566410297621 401 1344 341 428 Fra
Belgium 6233 188 5691 769 7795 195 1089 330 174 262 Be
695116756292 887 91351534 791 1827150719141655 Fin
Auetna 7143 766 6587 8708650 728 135412389361038 918 1443Aus
Uruguay 6448 11191910811957514911337 12151110211133410935 11190 1284211678Uru
Italy 7235 987 67471531 836310652008 1434129411081173 2204 764 11010 ta
Argentina 8359112899031120465071 114231222711105 1142411029 11282 1293011793210 11135
Clale 803611904874912609489012029 12710116511199211628 11868 13466124901344 11894 1135
Israel 951931248993 3191 105373127 3615361533503339330232412421 I2 231012236
Ireland 5458954491612437149 959 1269464 760 779 7762032168610896188710966
Span 610612805708 20757000 142123911264 1482105413162955181299211365 10024
Japan 10925 951310342 8714 14179937!8428958593159738947678399154 18575988118265
Mexico 3033 943736039529 359894489213894792369213 92649864 101727531102607366
Hong Kong 13137 9369 12446 86881638092508608964693009650 941678438749 18336 9300 18463
Peru 5639105356365 110612734 10629 11834 10162 1052110246 1044211826 112513292108583127
Costa Rica 3294919140149518188292449326873490748923 9049 100819957576698185622
Israel 13226 ICr
Ireland 114424077 Ire
Spain 10692 36021451 Spa
Japan 172349171 9611 10789Jap
Meuic 6585 1255284899083 11319Mee
Hong Kong 1867977409873 10561289314155 H K
Peru 2458128119839950415493424018379 Per
CostaRica 500712093 83208491 131851930'5933 2553
(Distances taken from Fitzpatrick and Modlin. 1986.)Invesrnent and Grot'tIi 61 Fri, Oct 5,1990
Appendix II: Regression Coefficients of Omitted
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Appendix III: Effects on Growth of the Prices of
Disaggregated Components of Investment
Table Alil
High Productivity Sample
(dependent variableisthe L960—85 GDI' per worker 9rowthriIc:ill regreflh1. neltIdc the 1960 relative GDP
per worker gap and the 196(J—85 labor forec growth rule as additional independent variables)
"Orthogonalii.ed
PricePricePricePriceInvest.
Mach. Eouin. Trans.Rate R2 SEE
-.017 .2(3 .0(2
(.008)








-.024 .1)59 .4)4 .1(10
I(K?-) 14)171
-.003 -.020 .31.S ((I)
(.009) (.0121
-.003 -.020 054 .3W OIl
(.009)(.0(2) (1361
-.004 -.029 (102 .378 .0))
(.0(0) (.0(3) (.007)
-.00) -.022 -1)03 .059 338 .0(1
(.010) (.0(41 (.1)08) (.0.47)
Forthe high productivity sample, the table above shows that—
whether or not the aggregate investment rate is included in the regression—
the price of electrical equipment has a weaker relationship to growth than
does the price of non-electrical machinery. When both price measures are
included in the regresion, the non-electrical machinery price swamps theInvestment and Growth 63 Fri, Oct 5, 1990
electrical equipment price (and swamps the price of producers' transport
equipment when it is included as well). When the pricevariables are
included in the regression one at a time, the coefficient on the non-electrical
price is twice the coefficient on the price of electrical equipment.And the
shift from including the electrical price to including the non-electrical price
raises the adjusted R2 by 3/4.
TableAIV
Larger Sample
(dependent variableisthe 1960—85 (ul)P perworkergrowth raLe: all regressions include the 1960 relative GDP
per workergapand the 1960—85 laborforcegrowth rate as additional independent variables)
Orthogonal i cd
PricePricePricePriceInvest.
Eke. Mpch. Epui. Trans.Rate R2 SEE
-.011 .047 1)15
(.005)








-.004 (39') (8) .0)4
007) (030)
-.0(0 -.002 .03) .1)15
(.008) (.01(1)
-.004 (8)) 0')') (67 0(4
(.007) .009) (.1(3))
-.0)0 .003 .002 .0)5 0)5
(.008)(.011) (.1.8(7)
-.004 .002 - (JO) .098 .151 .0(4
(.008)(.010) (.0061( 032j
Forthe larger sample, the prices of electrical equipment and non-
electrical machinery have identical coefficients in accounting for growthInvestment and Grmi'i/i 64 Fri. Oct 5,1990
when entered into the regression separately. Butthe relationshipbetween
growth rates and prices is very weak in the largersample.When the total
investment rate is included as an independent variable, the relative price
variables are never statistically significant or substantively important.
The fact that the non-electrical machinery price is more closely
associated with growth than the electrical equipment price is somewhat
anomalous. In Table IV, the quantity of electrical equipment had a much
stronger association with growth than the quantity of non-electrical
machinery. The disparity of coefficients in Table IV might be taken to
suggest that it is electrical equipment—not equipment in general—that has
the most powerful association with growth. But this pattern in prices is not
mirrored in quantities: the electrical equipment price has a relatively
unimpressive association with growth.
If the only data available were the quantities data, it would be natural
to hypothesize that electrical equipment played a very special role in
economic growth. If the only data available were the price data, it would be
natural to hypothesize that it was non-electrical machinery that generated
the largest productivity gains. Both sets of data are available and point in
different directions. We therefore use the "equipment" aggregate of
electrical and non-electrical machinery as the major independent variable.Investment and Grout/i 65 Fri. Oct 5, 1990
AppendixIV: Data
Table AV
Variables Used in Regressions
GOP'*94 GD9I 0200694 GDP*94L04 # L F L0006 F Eq. 06j. .- 06. Eq 06..
Ciy o*.01 00-10Co.0* 60-75 GI* 70-ISG.6.I* 70-ISG,o.l* 60.-OSG*o..U 40-75G...$. 76-10006.1? 75-45 60-16 10-75 75-00
049.0610. 00019 00242 -00033 -00*30 00111 00*20 00102 00104 00111 00732 002*0
00222 00471 00110 00*20 00054 -OO 01071 00000 0064* 00004 01023
0.69.06. 0.0254 00374 00*51 00042 00061 00041 00004 00011 00604 00467 00404
000066 00*24 00350 0 0024 00206 00209 00*66 0 0230 00240 00147 0.0*04 00112
00476 00741 00600 0 00*0 00239 0 0*62 003*6 00324 01310 0*664 0 764
00437 00600 00307 00119 20306 003*9 00307 02296 00446 00497 00470
C.,.oooo 00450 00302 00033 00005 00*69 00166 00*64 00160 064*6 00346 00444
C1006. 00*69 00220 00*3* 00092 00261 00264 00206 0022$ 00771 02*00 00772
COO. 2002* 000*6 00161 00025 002*4 00192 00240 0026* 00904 00154 00*54
CoO. 00731 00373 00196 00*13 00264 00296 0026,) 00260 00220 0.0263 00327
Co..1 0.0*01 0025* 00000 -0047? 00354 00366 0536* 00340 0433 0.04*2 0.0440
00117 002*4 001*2 00*45 00115 00*26 00109 00093 00606 00794 00404
04ç. 00199 00365 00130-0l 00290 00216 00372 003790I 0.0200 0036?
00263 00411 00300 00094 50074 00265 00266 00267 00303 0030100
O $th 00044 00229 -00001 '092*7 003*4 0033* 00296 . 00209 00323 00224 00730
E1104.8 00004 00164 000*6 00000 00206 002?, 00*53 00*07 00212 00324 0.032*
6444.6 00306 00376 00229 00*64 00003 00062 20112 00004 2 *104 01296 * 610*
Fl.,.. 00292 00439 00*70 00069 00019 00001 00001 00609 00111 904*2 00411
0.1.06.$ 02250 00346 00*30 00*30 00047 00030 00050 00013 00044 009*0 00002
00444 00411 00257 00*94 00044 00421 00000 00064 00465 00702 00044
G6...I. 00*49 00250 00012 400*4 00242 00237 00231 00254 00244 60314 00362
0011 00111 00*62 00076 0 0002 00303 00271 00320 0 0351 0.6440 0 0433 0.060*
00464 0.0404 0030* 004*4 0036 00367 00377 00346 00017 00734 00762
00115 00111 00010 02110 00170 00*50 00111 00*04 00276 00211 00262
00365 00254 00007 00404 002*3 00203 00222 00327 00229 09*64 00273
064.44 0020$ 00369 00210 00*17 0081 0006* 00136 00*40 00014 0,0730 00067
4444 0 9452 0 0924 0 0392 0 634* 0 0359 0 0342 0 0266 0 0290 0*662 0*210 0.1031
104y 00312 00419 20737 00733 00030 00023 00065 00010 00663 007*7 0.0473
I5..y C.i 2 0270 0 0442 00*61 00000 00274 0 0262 00251 0 0201 0 0243 60224 0.026*
00006 00044 -09276 '05446 0020* 00*97 00292 00292 00000 00739 00027
00*30 00606 00347 003*2 00111 00*4* 00077 00011 01223 01130 0*269
00*40 0 0260 00167 -00924 00344 0 0340 00390 0 0355 00462 00476 60404
00664 00470 00000 00900 00300 00202 00294 0026* 00262 06*61 00422 00547
L....t.g 00324 00303 00*13 00*30 00064 50046 00113 00064 00711 00762 006*3
6410.o. -00192 '00026 002*3 002*7 00203 00201 002*0 00204 00210 00733 00325
M64. 00*53 00364 00094 -01040 00224 002*6 00237 00243 00361 00300 0.0366
6464... 00222 00296 00352 0036? 003*6 00304 00344 00335 00444 00375 000*9
0444 00041 -0107* 00223 00210 00*04 00164 00*96 002?? 00433 00406 00453
60.... 20191 003*0 00076 00405 00310 00301 06064' 00360 0.9773 0.0240 0.0200
00243 00426 00010 -00030 0020* 00244 00339 00324 0.0260 00210 0.0369
0023* 0030) 00*07 00636 00*46 00*47 00*46 00*45 00771 0.0101 00701
*496.64 -60047 00001 -01075 '002*7 00253 00200 00299 00207 00364 0025* 00475
00264 00772 06244 00242 00*54 00*07 00640 00*40 00796 00731 00714 Pa* 00295 00350 00*70 00346 00250 00229 00293 00300 00203 00203 00203
00296 00305 00*06 00*60 00279 002*4 00213 0027* 00246 00420 054*4
00291 00202 00314 00350 00269 00277 00330 00223 00161 00*37 00223
00*07 00365 -00*04 00754 0227? 00203 0032? 00313 00247 00204 00200
00*70 02215 00*35 00007 07253 00256 00249 00290 00445 00423 00445
003*1 00530 00141 20007 0011$ 0000* 0029* 00*75 00729 00729 00735
5.n.gO 00011 00617 00040 '01053 00274 00204 0020* 00257 00*03 00*01 00*00
So.. 00373 004*7 00*02 00017 00066 05940 00092 00*0? 00307 00430 00402
56*1.1*. 00137 -00030 00320 00391 00207 002*2 00206 00*07 00*34 00*34 00140 7..... 00*04 0020* 00003 00030 00270 00272 00201 00293 00604 00046 00464
0036* 0035* 00309 00307 00270 00209 00270 00260 00305 00377 00377
00279 00361 00276 00*72 00254 00206 0035* 0034* 001200.l 00440
UK 00*61 002*4 00163 00153 00040 0044$ 0004$ 00061 00004 00740 60466
US 00133 00633 9001* 00*33 00*00 00*94 00107 0017$ 00162 00779 00793
L0*qy 0.004* 0009, 00014 -00032 00692 00051 00035 00042 00105 0069* 0.0*91
0100.14646 00*24 00407 -400*2 00296 00376 0035* 0044* 0.94*7 0 0340 40303 00446
0.1.164 '00110 0047* 00241 00375 00275 00204 0020$ 00297 00702 0*364 00646
001*0 0.0112 00*15 00002 0026*9 00320 0020* 00271 00943 00070 00771Investment and Growth 66 Fri9 Oct 5, 1990
0qp64,.. 746n5,ao 600 (at 9on1a 64oa•Eq,.p 036 40 GOP9% 000.90j GOPJ%ny Eat
Ca.'ty 75-46 64a.60-4654,.. 60-ISSlit. '0-46SIt. 76-66 Ox. '690 G 7670 Ct 7976 Ct 1996 1600
kgn 00210 02210 02372 023.'' 32246 062'9 36020 76394 06391 090
*sEt. 01013 0 7340 73.4, 401 71364 064., 04236 03746 02737 706
9.4904m 0 0566 0 7663 ci934 0 7963 0 '626 04709 02609 0 7077 a '69 709
06... 00757 07133 07292 01136 07029 09634 06432 01123 allii 064
9.9,..,. 01910 01490 07327 02010 01633 09474 09754 01734 01273 642
8764 00693 91011 07777 01639 01679 01491 07740 06600 06346 0%
00003 00196 00743 00990 07074 09333 09339 09743 01741 066
Ct7154 00762 07626 07544 07630 01677 07763 07667 00650 00719 704
CM. 00164 02646 02946 02946 02646 05402 05065 06707 05095 109
Cos.,6.a 00226 07663 07906 01044 01476 07696 07499 06662 06040 977
C.a 6.. 00446 07067 07013 01102 01096 07043 06766 06407 06470 0%
Dwm..6 0.0662 07934 02703 07963 01761 04779 03647 03320 03796 703
0.at,RoçitAc 00403 01379 01211 01671 01730 06213 09730 0 7636 07490 0%
0.a9 00324 02067 02796 02336 02239 09200 09734 07364 06974 963
BSs. 00233 00677 00507 00694 06602 09414 00353 09794 09344 096
64.0944 00226 00269 00311 00307 00306 09406 09600 09794 09766 096
07062 02494 02679 02476 02269 06646 04664 03703 43300 II?
F,.... 00762 01767 07691 01977 07773 04704 03749 07033 11371 944
00749 01115 02749 07969 01769 04645 0.3370 02566 07633 032
0.0400 60669 02245 02406 02297 02096 07134 96477 09417 06206 940
G,.sS. 00393 00676 00490 00637 00639 07116 07904 6740.4 07734 945
99460,. 99451 90664 90979 00914 00615 09950 09764 *9746 49673 907
00907 07223 67772 07224 07294 07477 06237 66797 04324 097
00333 07444 0.7307 07496 01467 09366 40397 99370 49346 III
01296 07779 00470 07469 07011 06243 09376 09495 49637 96'
644.6 00944 01979 07673 07993 07643 04457 06774 94993 04270 770
6444 00936 07769 07962 07967 01706 06976 09476 04302 02669 999
ISy 00647 07790 07607 07707 01424 06447 73969 02779 07547 III
PcyCos7 00298 00967 00961 07709 07767 09707 09029 04719 09639 044
2467.04 09447 07467 07747 77256 71766 09236 07490 07372 99793 063
209017 07767 02444 02393 72696 72712 07494 uSd71 04419 03476 702
0o7'y. 00173 07264 07367 013C 01167 00476 09460 00294 DES 047
Owl. 00702 0 1180 07237 02027 02766 0 090' 0560' 07799 07427 094
00467 07944 02747 01906 07749 72942 07603 00943 00400 '35
64999.0. 00222 00447 00494 0046.7 07497 09277 09327 09342 09449 052
Mn.. 00362 00937 00994 07636 00990 09627 09617 09622 0963.0 043
610744 00949 01479 01541 02116 02373 07963 07664 07203 01436 096
MS 0.0477 00267 00396 07279 07267 09479 09440 09610 *662 079
6.000 00097 71917 01434 07766 07779 0002' 05766 04963 04777 0%
6407.0 0.0346 00640 00467 00401 07756 09405 07700 07646 0 7003 017
9649.4.0. 00476 01791 02030 07794 01664 03606 02776 07043 00977 796
PEg.o. 0.0636 00942 00699 01111 07269 09679 09663 09709 09742 034
64aay 9.0690 02199 02262 02247 02763 03755 03296 02334 07962 774
PSaan 00293 00907 00999 00490 60090 09190 09974 09071 09077 436
Pu..... 0.0366 62272 02424 02366 02067 09076 07476 07726 96496 0%
Pw..p 00268 07071 00737 01191 07360 09451 09702 00293 07620 911
00240 00*33 07027 00977 00036 07409 04797 04409 01449 IC
91n. 00423 00974 00996 00974 70696 01747 0.. 09409 09226 9%
Pa9696 07472 0.7771 07677 07963 07460 09033 07200 04500 06729 039
0.wS 0.0777 00407 0.0071 00972 00747 09494 09027 09040 09793 027
59.7 00399 77365 07466 07320 07313 06673 44943 03177 02201 779
987..4. 00764 01392 07076 07464 07637 09566 06029 09900 09632 910
Twa... 00497 00940 00414 07042 00990 09702 09731 09704 09672 939
00377 07472 07347 07347 07347 09774 00077 00996 0*671 003
7,na 00445 07972 00076 07071 01700 07439 07677 07026 06740 096
094 00633 01132 77226 07747 07749 0430' 04201 03647 03336 010
00 00760 07304 01342 07360 07327 00007 00000 00000 00000 III
6h,qay 00777 07764 70796 77774 21216 06792 06377 00039 05347 III
6n0S4 00600 00747 00566 07996 01134 04974 04409 02503 03376 7%
2.,ba 00974 07972 72965 77944 01461 09966 09137 09000 09776 049
00603 07267 07463 21759 01732 00976 70990 09790 00077 011Fri, Oct 5, 1990
M.,iwrç P50.. 9.1 Em WOO D61149Somy E.d.S..i 06t
64.' #06.00675 P0064990



























































































































































0.99n1. 027 006 065 506 07645 00202 -05.499













006 OIl 077 020 07626 05426 -07357
6440646 030 017 08 000 0010$ 00)74 .02500






















































06196*. 019 076 004 009 01991 46443
6606 009 029 000 OIl -03621
64.4.0 055 006 072 001 02194 45766
I*6 000 01$ 004 04 01711 42610

























P..... 0.29 025 009 412 06043 00796 03704
P67 III $12 004 04 $1051 00699 42956
9.4 010 010 055 015 02900 -67334
P$.. 02$ 057 07) 044 0 2904 50336 -065)2
02 076 000 02) 03042 03667 -840%
S.n. 00) 020 54 004 07367 00270 -03575
594. 023 570 SI 04 03779 00597 -07940
Sn LW. 027 025 006 006 02063 5.0374 I V92
044... 092 035 000 005 02967
Th06.46 052 052 554 037 02069 79556
T*, 072 077 5.04 200 07779 57345 -03034
00 047 022 730 059 02307 00299 20073
US 010 076 25.0 000 02400 00263 00010
6497 037 011 019 000 02005 05*41 45079
04414.16 021 017 072 0)7 01109 00*63 4762)
Z..10. 005 5)2 000 005 00100 41115













































229lni'est,nent and Growth 68 Fri, Oct 5,1990
5oo 7190.0.to.. S1o06,.. El.o M90 *90I-6? M90jon.. El Po 0w..,* 0 E05 0IQl4.00 0
Cy L.ths 0p.0000. 9.. 00-OSOils. 60-15 05s. 60-05 06s. 60-10Os. Eq?rn 060 G 1075006
00016 02271 00025 00700 1 20005 00130 00775
44.4.704 60 04.4.4 00279 0 043 00245 0014.6 0 2009* 00570 00312
464 0427 00230 07022 00232 00452 0 00047 00207 00774.
04071. 00094 02911 00039 00729 0 00003 0074.4 00730
0*06*.. 0024! 0 7250 000*0 00l2 00172 024? 01144
87.16 465 00101 07679 0073* 00070 05042 0004.9 00440
C..,.ooo 00212 00673 00066 003.40 0 4.00?? 00367 00319
644 0073 00254 014.0? 0023? 0053, 05000 00731 00054
C111. 00131 03200 00020 0073.4 I 00002 00103 00064
00725 0741 00725 00704 7 00000 00176 00151
00270 00148 00016 00359 . 00079 00305 00211
090 -0271 00273 07106 00777 00577 0 00047 00200 00226
Oos.. 0104001 000*0 0 7403 00065 00254 00070 00264 00245
00103 02307 00077 60214 I 00009 00249 00221
eSs 00747 00436 00043 0070? 00000 OlIN 00783
00069 00210 00070 00703 I 40001 00204 00208
643 -0121 00141 02276 00270 00096 0 00745 00074 00447
40 079 09360 0646 00790 00600 0 00077 40474 00101
72.7 0043 00331 07810 00205 00604 0 00079 0*404 0*22!
Go.. 301 -0294 00295 22278 00774 00542 00043 00579 •01
Gs...40. 0 9089 003)9 0 0060 00370 . 00070 80303 00280
00206 00748 4.007! 00370 00020 00395 00396
846 00211 07143 00306 0016! 0 00050 00073 00444
040. 463 00004 07372 0009! 00107 I 00000 00210 00210
043 00029 OIlS! 00000 00275 I 00060 00204 002*7
864 129 0 055 00303 07009 4.0090 00724 0 00060 *0024 0*406
8640 00700 07769 00771 00997 I 00724 00154 00405
164y 400 -6.031 00373 0 7190 00274 00469 00047 00371 00109
kvC64.l 00242 00770 00047 00784 I 00006 00224 08212
3.117*00 0.0340 07116 00130 00471 I 004.37 10541 00449
31000 0? 000* 00395 02313 0041! 00753 0 00150 00016 00544
*1.700 00240 00511 00103 00309 I 00027 8 0435 40430
04.40 670 00291 07309 00772 80410 0 00031 0*480 00434
04.1*110.184. 864 00246 07*19 00203 00540 0 00051 I 0204 00064
61*00411*. 00053 00427 00017 00202 00005 803172 00208
0064... 00723 00702 00087 00278 - 00073 0*347 00343
l064y*4 060 00728 0775? 05009 00309 0 4.0070 00390 003)7
00001 00772 00047 00362 . 00019 00477 00477
IN.10 501 00115 0 7542 00081 00785 0 00067 00161 00726
00703 00340 00040 0027, - 00037 00770 00117
16411*4.0. 709 0039 00373 07554 00234 00504 0 0006? 00211 00111
80900. 00762 00640 00772 02236 I 00573 00307 00372
t64y 903 *229 00317 07459 00750 00043 0 00049 00263 00741
00066 00773 00034 00278 I 00007 0024? 00227
00207 02072 00707 00202 00070 18311 00271
00135 00723 00075 00110 00004 00700 00757
0.4. 00055 00450 00010 00227 I 00007 00191 00111
00750 00795 00705 00709 1 00020 00301 00374
007549.1 463 0050 00260 4.1372 00730 00003 00053 00540 00474
S.1.90 00011 0072* 00039 00750 1 00004 00772 00775
Sps 908 -6197 00783 07370 00720 00777 2 2007* 002*2 00124
S,L.0. 00003 07477 00023 00714 I 00002 0011* 00771
TlflI*04 002*9 00730 007*0 00700 1 00074 0064.0 00035
11140.70 II? 4.0721 07797 00060 00310 7 00076 02363 00352
00230 00733 00102 00326 I 00070 00336 00307
Oil 014 0047 00290 0004* 00187 00073 0 00048 00209 00749
US 515 -0027 00298 07305 002*2 00500 0 00000 00000 00000
00046 01021 02015 00740 7 02002 0000* 00033
V.11.014.11 00148 00640 02204 00254 00070 00190 00080
0044* 07000 00257 004*6 . 05049 00611 00611
0.10*.. 00264 00993 001*5 00678 00077 00749 00147investment and Growth 69 Fri1 Oct 5, 1990
Ogtg.w60 0q,aonn 0 S*gfl46 07.4419.06 000107406 4w06n1r41)tI000.4toto*.C00n03Wflt.g*.d NaaS
Con7 Ds.0 63-73 Oa.ao 73-40Ooa. 00-10S0. 00-75 501a. 70-45 0-a. 75—OS5-on Pta Eqap Poa Cl.. P0o 20-.. Ptia0.ocç. .
00214 *0214 035 *2034 0754* 02456 001*1 02004 -*2771 -*0044 76
4.a.a 023 *2007 02423 02369 -00607 -00700 02241 07603 273
073 02162 02291 02144 00430 007li -00670 00370 27
944.-a 05003 00167 003 01412 00300 01110 02004 -06399 90
Son_n 020 02493 03777 03443 -07421 00266 -13
OS 07936 01036 023 02460 02210 02119 -07736 -07732 223
Can.oo. 01244 0 2630 013 01261 0 7454 01071 -00229 00440 033
023 02394 02303 02273 00063 -01173 00460 02430 24
CS. 00754 00402 03 03060 03000 0300* 00700 06917 46479 -10440 113
CoCoa 02446 00407 011 07050 01706 01719 04776 43763 270
C-o.sRa 07360 00607 070 01423 01560 07040 40623 00904 03790 -40622 735
037 02060 02542 02290 -03711 43754 40002 40821 63
5w.na.9.p.tAo 00000 00000 017 07636 02060 02133 02030 -IWO I
OS 024 02317 02009 02042 03390 48043 74
00147 00447 026 07677 00625 00005 07837 03620 70
Et. 00272 00272 000 00036 00032 00034 -07 96704 73
roan oji 03972 03002 03302 -04253 -04*6' 47942 42060 203
P'aoo. 026 03703 02617 02004 00062 00276 40017 40226 333
04o7n.9 029 03000 02600 02520 -0047' 00709 41102 40820 213
54.006 029 03706 02905 02095 -02500 42046 113
Ca0aa 01107 0.0714 059 56539 05976 0002 02537 02024 65
4d1a 00093 00192 071 01301 00470 07170 00011 60333 14
OaçOoç 03000 03449 02 0904 0 '660 22703 -01710 -07006 06757 05469 30
6406 0527$ 05276 077 07000 77793 57907 07000 42739 II
00442 50447 074 01070 27737 01177 07427 49671 713
81a4 520 07003 026*7 02950 02369 02170 40073 45360 22
6600 239 03760 52704 02040 07092 02026 07376 51331 13
ty 025 07676 0230$ 02790 07501 07220 40623 00*06 223
l.7C.s 57729 50460 077 07750 01301 57457 -00770 00620 00
jata 02094 52476 57790 07491 43607 60007 23
528 03520 0.3127 03713 40446 45577 00062 00033 31
0.050 0.005 00020 007 07037 07763 07547 47462 0.0*06 773
Ens 5.2004 02004 022 07704 02174 02962 42824 47W 23
Lsaath.iag 027 0700 5257$ 02450 0 7304 6740 00456 074-3
M00iQca 00631 50219 007 07733 00711 00706 07073 64960 00
161_ 073 01301 07437 07299 47446 63479 6
S4a. 01001 07327 0232303 07904 02704 02962 40160 440*0 363
MS - 007 07763 00732 00676 47561 96647 23
INn 00540 00045 0195936$ 0003 02057 02005 04100 03616 4360* 4WO 16
Mn.n 04 06463 07000 07720 07101 ohiO 13
9660.Owt 039 02009 02440 02096 07242 00960 00699 60799 II
00716 00360 072 06301 07593 07214 46057 60079 II
OSny 029 02163 02983 02179 07213 00000 00077 07666 29
Pain 00263 00020 012 07200 01743 00872 07038 07069 12
Pr,.... 029 03621 02704 02445 00216 -h IS
Pa.9.7 012 09649 01474 01613 01111 00334 16
Pr,. 00267 00207 012 07337 07724 01011 03220 05276 07964 02064 07
00000 00090 075 00040 01679 00966 02700 02107 113
PaLod 000 0.2360 02297 07722 40706 67243 19
0044 00306 0 07000 07006 00911 07270 03403 7
09. 0*6 07904 07732 01870 00770 00263 40253 4037 23
70ILa4i. 00030 00270 070 07454 07606 01111 06367 4W0 13
00964 07060 011 07770 01990 07617 46000 47310
79.04.1 07706 07164 07907120 07774 0*770 07969 41111 40004 223
To's 00104 07205 074 07251 07456 07000 07966 00603 Il
00 07$ 07413 27700 07640 40796 4429 01001 01821 II
00 027 02772 02732 02073 0000' 00044 40210 00173 703
2019449 00700 00464 072 09074 07532 01012 02994 03111 41371 42101 740
Ornail. 517 01117 07427 07610 07772 02002 04104 03604 200
laoS. 00152 00702 537 56237 02000 07737 40276 40700 36
lost... 227 22120 07037 27724 -03401 47364 223Investment and Growth 70 Fri1 Oct 5, 1990
E,dI.SnAc P,oc CS PinIt.' Pot. 2Mm..'. I)aInd QjWS
C..,'y 9.1. Ciii.' Cimu CiSmIL Oem.' Ra*eç(Mad 63-73 (Mad 73-es
3 2 3 I 23 I I
4..,,,
eel.. 3 2 3 1 2' 2
eq-n
1 2 3 1 14 3 3
Cs.....' I I 7 3 3 3 2
Cad.
Clii. 3 I 3 3 24 I 3










1 3 2 2 12 I




I7CoS I 3 3 3 16 3 2
Ja..s.' 2 2 3 ii n
Kny. I 3 2 2 S 2 2
I I 2 4 I 4
—
2
MS.. 1 I 2 I
Melays. I I 2 2 5 3 3
Mo
S I I 3 2 15 2 3
poet
3 2 3 3 26 2 I
PS,... 2 3 2 3 ii I 2
P.', I 3 3 7 22 I I
PiSccw I 2 7 I 5 2 2
Pnçel
1 2 2 2 17 2 2
Spn
3.1*9w I 2 3 3 II I 2
TV,...'. I 3 3 3 3$ I I
IlMo,d I 2 I I 2 3 3
TIan I 3 2 I 7 2 3
710
723
3 3 3 I 20 1 3
On',..
Z.iiba I
bItt..